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Federal Refugee Resettlement
Policy: Asserting the States'
Tenth Amendment Defense
By David N. Knudson*

With the fall of Saigon in 1975, America's direct military involvement in Vietnam and Southeast Asia ostensibly came to an
end. As the United States pulled its final cadre of advisors out of
the capital city, more than one million federal government employees and their dependents were left behind, as were tens of
thousands of intelligence and security-related personnel.1 Their
loyalty and steadfast service had been premised in part on
promises of continuing American support. Many argued that the
United States had a continuing moral obligation to those who contributed to the war effort, whose loyalty would likely result2 in
harsh treatment at the hands of the new Communist regime. It

was urged that America open her doors to these government and
professional persons and their families.3
The installation of a new Vietnamese government did little to
*

B.A., 1977, California State University, San Francisco; member, third year class.

1. See The Refugee Act of 1979: Hearings on S. 643 Before the Senate Comm. on the
Judiciary,96th Cong., 1st Sess. 155 (1979) (statement of American Friends Service Comm.)
[hereinafter cited as 1979 Senate Judiciary Comm. Hearings].
2. See Hearings on Indochina Refugees Before the Subcomm. on Immigration, Citizenship and InternationalLaw of the House Comm. on the Judiciary,94th Cong., 1st Sess.
56-58 (1975) (statement of Ambassador L. Dean Brown, Director, Interagency Task Force,
Department of State) [hereinafter cited as 1975 House Judiciary Comm. Hearings]. The

events have been documented in F. SNEPP,

DECENT INTERVAL

(1977). See also Greetingsfor

Refugees: From Open Arms to Hostility, U.S. NEws & WORLD REP., May 5, 1975, at 22-23.
3. One argument favoring admission was that because of their education, these refugees would have little trouble adjusting to life in a new country. In 1975, however, there was
a strong sentiment against Vietnamese refugees, based on American attitudes about the war
in Vietnam and the then-current high unemployment statistics. A Gallup poll taken in May
1975, indicated that 54% of Americans were opposed to the admission of these refugees.
TIME, May 19, 1975, at 9. See generally J. TAFT, D. NORTH & D. FORD, REFUGEE RESETTrEMENT IN THE U.S.: TIME FOR A NEW Focus 103-04 (1979) (report prepared for Social Security
Admin., Dep't of HEW, by the New TransCentury Foundation, Washington, D.C.) [hereinafter cited as TRANSCENTURY FOUNDATION STUDY].

[877]

878

HASTINGS CONSTITUTIONAL LAW QUARTERLY

[Vol. 8:877

ameliorate living conditions for these people. Since the Communist
takeovers of Vietnam, Cambodia and Laos, a steady stream of refugees has continued to flow from Southeast Asia.4 In 1977 and
1978, the attention of the world was strikingly drawn to the plight
of the "boat people,"5 as thousands of refugees sought to escape
their homelands on flimsy, overcrowded, often unseaworthy craft,
many falling prey to hunger, rough seas, or pirates. Escape was
often effected with the approval of local government authorities by
payment of gold and other valuables.7 As the boat people were refused permission to land in other Southeast Asian countries, or, at
best, were relocated in crowded, makeshift camps, humanitarians
everywhere called upon wealthier nations to admit and resettle as
many refugees as possible."
4. See 1975 House Judiciary Comm. Hearings,supra note 2, at 56-58. Since 1975, it is
estimated that more than 1.5 million refugees have fled their homeland in Indochina. CONG.
RES. SERV., REPORT TO SENATE COMM. ON THE JUDICIARY, 96TH CONG., 1ST SESS., WORLD REF-

UGEE CRISIS: THE INTERNATIONAL COMMUNITY'S RESPONSE 134 (Comm. Print 1979) [hereinafter cited as WORLD REFUGEE CRISIS].

5. See U.S. Opens its Doors to the "FloatingRefugees," U.S. NEWS & WORLD REP.,
Aug. 15, 1977, at 21. The number of boat refugees from Vietnam reached 60,000 per month
by June 1979. WORLD REFUGEE CRISIS, supra note 4, at 135-37. Many boat people were
induced to flee because of Communist resettlement plans to relocate them in "New Economic Zones" in remote parts of the country; cold weather, droughts, floods and crop diseases aggravated living conditions. In March 1978, 30,000 private businesses were closed by
the government; six weeks later, a new currency was introduced. These actions prompted
many businessmen to flee. See Elmer, Nations Should Welcome the 'Boat People,' Providence Evening Bull., Jan. 17, 1979, reprinted in 1979 Senate Judiciary Comm. Hearings,
supra note 1, at 158.
6. U.S. NEWS & WORLD REP., Aug. 15, 1977, at 21; Damn the Refugees and Full Speed
Ahead, COMMONWEAL, Sept. 1, 1978, at 549. One problem posed by the boat people occurred
when a ship would "rescue" a boatload of refugees; often no country would accept them, and
the captain was "stuck." See Note, The Dilemma of the Sea Refugee: Rescue Without Refuge, 18 HARv. INT'L L.J. 577 (1977) (considering aspects of the seaman's duty to rescue). In
1978, President Carter ordered the United States Navy to assist the boat people in spite of
allegations that knowledge of such assistance would induce more refugees to abandon their
homelands and take to the high seas. See Refugee Crisis in Southeast Asia: HearingBefore
the Senate Comm. on the Judiciary, 96th Cong., 1st Sess. 7, 11 (July 26, 1979). The Navy
has continued to assist Indochinese refugees. Navy Ships Save 246 Vietnam Boat People,
S.F. Chronicle, Apr. 22, 1981, at 16, col. 1.
7. Payments of $2,000 or more in gold or dollars were often required. Many of these
refugees were ethnic Chinese, often merchants in Vietnamese society, who came under increasing pressure from the new regime. WORLD REFUGEE CRISIS, supra note 4, at 137.
8. A major concern of United States refugee policy has been to secure cooperation of
other countries in settling refugees. Other countries which have accepted Indochinese refugees include Australia, France, Norway, Belgium, New Zealand, Canada and Austria. Some
countries have accepted a higher proportion relative to their populations-e.g., Australia has
104 refugees per 100,000; the United States has 25 per 100,000. 1979 Senate Judiciary
Comm. Hearings, supra note 1, at 38.
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In response to the obligation owed to its former allies, and for
humanitarian reasons, the United States has admitted more than
455,000 Southeast Asian refugees since 1975. 9 Refugees are admitted to this country and are relocated in new homes as a result of
the coordinated efforts of no fewer than four departments of the
executive branch, 10 and with the participation of a number of voluntary agencies." Once within a given locality, refugees may qualify for state welfare and social service benefits.' 2 Although current
federal funding provides cash and medical assistance for only three
years, after that time refugees may apply for available state welfare benefits where they reside.'3 Additionally, refugees may require special services in language training, education, and job assistance before they are able to become integrated into a state's social
and economic structure. 4 State and local governments, faced with
ever-increasing costs of providing services, are thus required to respond to the presence of refugees settled within a community
under authority of the federal government.
This note will examine several ways in which federal refugee
resettlement policy has a detrimental effect on the states: the impact of the use of state funds for refugee programs, the impact on
the integral governmental functions of the states, and the problems
created by the implementation of federal programs. Specifically,
this note will explore federal refugee resettlement procedures in
light of their effect on the powers reserved to the states under the
Tenth Amendment of the Constitution, and will suggest procedures which may be less harmful to state sovereign interests.
I.

A Survey of United States Refugee Policy

A. Historical Background
The United States has consistently advocated an open-door
policy toward "the oppressed and persecuted of all nations and re9. Refugees- Who Will Pay?, S.F. Examiner, Mar. 30, 1981, at B2, col. 1. The estimate
of Indochinese refugees resettled in the United States as of June 1, 1979, was 204,228.
TRANsCCENTURY FOUNDATION STUDY, supra note 3, at 103 n.1. See also 1979 Senate Judiciary
Comm. Hearings,supra note 1, at 29 (184,334 refugees estimated as of February 1979).
10. These are the Departments of State, Health and Human Services (formerly
Health, Education and Welfare), Justice, and Defense. TRANSCENTURY FoUNDATION STUDY,
supra note 3, at 33-38. See also notes 73 & 83-87 and accompanying text infra.
11. TRANSCENTURY FOUNDATION STUDY, supra note 3, at 39-42. See also note 74 infra.
12. 1979 Senate Judiciary Comm. Hearings, supra note 1, at 59 (statement of Norman V. Lourie, Chairman, National Coalition for Refugee Resettlement).
13. Id. at 31.
14. TRANSCENTURY FOUNDATION STUDY, supra note 3, at 43.
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ligions whom we shall wellcome [sic] to a participation of all our
rights and privileges."1 5 Despite sporadic instances of overt racial
hostility directed toward various immigrant groups, 16 no significant
restrictions were placed on immigration until 1875 when the first
act regulating immigration was passed. 1 7 By the end of World War
I, the immigration foci had shifted from Northern and Western
Europe to Southern and Eastern Europe;18 in response to fears of
"racial dilution" and calls for job preservation, the first "country of
origin" quota laws were passed. 9 These quotas remained in effect
until Congress passed the Immigration Amendments of 1965.20
15. Address by George Washington, New York, Dec. 2, 1783, reprinted in THE

WRIT-

INGS OF GEORGE WASHINGTON 254 (J. Fitzpatrick ed. 1938). A summary of United States
refugee policy may be found in SELECT COMM'N ON IMMIGRATION AND REFUGEE POLICY, U.S.
IMMIGRATION POLICY AND THE NATIONAL INTEREST, 88-89 (1981) [hereinafter cited as SELECT
COMMISSION REPORT].

16. In 1837, a recession in Europe brought large numbers of Irish and German immigrants to this country. The Native American Party ("Know-Nothings") appealed to Americans to "unite against foreign labor and not be ousted from their employment 'by cheapworking foreigners.'" See generally E. HARPER, IMMIGRATION LAWS OF THE UNITED STATES 148 (3d ed. 1975); J. WASSERMAN, IMMIGRATION LAW AND PRACTICE (1979).

17. Act of Mar. 3, 1875, 18 Stat. 477. See E. HARPER, supra note 16, at 5. Through the
late 1800's, various "Chinese Exclusion Acts" were passed. The Chinese Exclusion Act of
May 5, 1892, 27 Stat. 25 (1892), prohibiting Chinese from entering the United States and
providing for deportation upon failure to obtain a certificate of residence was upheld in
Fong Yue Ting v. United States, 149 U.S. 698 (1893). Other intense anti-alien sentiment was
directed at Italians (late 1800's) and at Slavs (1930's). See E. HARPER, supra note 16, at 148.
18.

See generally P. WANG, LEGISLATING NORMALCY: THE IMMIGRATION ACT OF 1924

(1975). Americans were motivated by a myriad of fears: a fear of racial dilution; a feeling
that recent immigrants had actually hindered the country's war effort; an accusation of
profit-seeking motives on the part of recent immigrants (many of whom had left the country
after the first world war, taking with them considerable sums of money); and a fear of Communist and Bolshevist ideologies. Id. at 1-14.
19. Act of May 19, 1921, ch. 8, 42 Stat. 5; the Act was amended by the Immigration
Act of 1924, ch. 190, 43 Stat. 153. The effect of these Acts was to limit the number of
immigrants of any nationality to 3% of the foreign-born persons of that nationality living in
the United States in 1910. This procedure favored Northern and Western European migrants. E. HARPER, supra note 16, at 11.

The immigration laws were substantially revised in 1952 by the McCarran Act, Pub. L.
No. 92-414, 66 Stat. 163 (1952) (codified at 8 U.S.C. §§ 1101-1503). These revisions, however, maintained the national-origins quota system. President Truman vetoed the bill for
that reason, but his veto was overridden by Congress. See SENATE COMM. ON THE JUDICIARY,
96TH CONG., 1ST SESs., REPORT ON U.S. IMMIGRATION LAW AND POLICY: 1952-1979, at 5-6

(Comm. Print 1979) [hereinafter cited as 1979

SENATE REPORT ON IMMIGRATION LAW AND

POLICY].

20. Act of Oct. 3, 1965, Pub. L. No. 89-236, 79 Stat. 911. By this time, it was recognized that the national-origins quota system was no longer desirable. The 1965 amendments
and the history of the bill are summarized in 1979 SENATE REPORT ON IMMIGRATION LAW AND
POLICY, supra note 19, at 51-58; see also E. HARPER, supra note 16, at 38-42.
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From 1875 until the period following World War II, refugees

were given no special consideration; if they met the nationalorigins admission criteria established for other immigrants, they
could be admitted. Following World War H, a number of congressional exceptions to the Immigration and Naturalization Act quota
system permitted the admission of war refugees. 21 Acts such as the
Displaced Persons Act of 1948,22 the Refugee Relief Act of 1953,2s
and Acts of July 29, 1953,24 September 3, 1954,2" and September 2,
1958,26 were temporary in nature, admitting groups of refugees
from specific countries.27 These refugees were not subject to the
numerical quotas of the Immigration and Naturalization Act; Congress' continued admission of groups of refugees emphasized the
ineffectiveness of the quota system in responding to changing
world conditions.
The post-World War II period saw two major changes in immigration law. In 1952, the McCarran Act,28 passed over the veto
of President Truman,2 9 continued the quota system, but made ma21. There were approximately 30 million displaced persons in Europe following World
War II. The Truman Doctrine of Dec. 22, 1945, called for U.S. consular officials to give visa
preference to refugees; voluntary agencies, in turn, agreed to meet all costs of settlement.
TRANSCENTURY FOUNDATION STUDY, supra note 3, at 6 (citing H. TRUMAN, THE PAPERs OF
HARRY S. TRUMAN). For a discussion of the voluntary agencies, see note 74 and accompanying text infra.
22. Displaced Persons Act of 1948, ch. 647, 62 Stat. 1009 as amended by Act of June
16, 1950, ch. 262, 64 Stat. 219; Act of June 28, 1951, ch. 167, 65 Stat. 96; Immigration and
Nationality Act, ch. 477, 66 Stat. 163, 277 (1952).
23. Refugee Relief Act of 1953, ch. 336, 67 Stat. 400, as amended by Act of Aug. 31,
1954, ch. 1169, 68 Stat. 1044 (permitting entry of war orphans, German expellees, Italian,
Dutch and Greek refugees, and others). The Act also permitted visas for Far Eastern, Chinese and Arab refugees, a departure from previous immigration policy. 1979 SENATE REPORT
ON IMMIGRATION LAW AND POLICY, supra note 19, at 17. See Smith, Refugees, 367 ANNALS 45
(1966).
24. Act of July 29, 1953, ch. 268, 67 Stat. 229 (orphans).
25. Act of Sept. 3, 1954, ch. 1254, 68 Stat. 1145 (sheepherders from oversubscribed
quota areas).
26. Act of Sept. 2, 1958, Pub. L. No. 85-892, 72 Stat. 1712 (victims of natural disasters
in the Azores; Dutch-Indonesians).
27. See notes 22-26 and accompanying text supra. See generally 1979 SENATE REPORT
ON IMMIGRATION LAW AND POLICY, supra note 19, at 17-24. Congress continued such "omnibus" legislation into the 1960's with the enactment of Act of Sept. 26, 1961, Pub. L. No. 87301, 75 Stat. 650 (various groups), and Act of Oct. 24, 1962, Pub. L. No. 87-885, 76 Stat.
1247 (backlogged preference cases). Id. at 44-45.
28. Immigration and Nationality (McCarran) Act, Pub. L. No. 92-414, 66 Stat. 163
(1952) (codified at 8 U.S.C. §§ 1101-1503).
29. See note 19 supra. Truman derided the continuation of the quota system: "[T]his
quota system keeps out the very people we want to bring in. It is incredible that [we are]
enacting into law such a slur on the patriotism, the capacity, and the decency of a large part
of our citizenry...
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jor revisions in the Immigration and Naturalization Act.30 In 1965,
the national-origins quota system was repealed s" and replaced by a
seven-category preference system emphasizing family reunification
and the admission of refugees with desired skills. 3 Refugees, it

should be noted, are in the seventh preference category, absent any
factors which might place them in a higher category.3
In the context of refugee admissions, the most significant feature of the Immigration and Naturalization Act reform was the retention of the Attorney General's parole power.3 4 Under sec-

In no other realm of our national life are we so hampered and stultified by the dead
hand of the past, as we are in this field of immigration." H. R. Doc. No. 520, 82nd Cong., 2d
Sess. 4-5 (1952).
Truman had appointed a commission to study and evaluate the proposed legislation.
Exec. Order No. 10,392, 3 C.F.R. 896 (1949-1953 Compilation) (1952). The presidential commission's report refuted the tenets underlying the McCarran Act, and concluded that "immigration policy should express a spirit of friendliness and generosity to the less fortunate
people of the world." R. DIVINE, AMERICAN IMMIGRATION POLICY, 1924-52, at 165 (1957). See
U.S. PRESIDENT'S COMM'N. ON IMMIGRATION AND NATURALIZATION: WHOM WE SHALL WEL-

(1953).
30. Significant modifications included the elimination of race and sex as bars to imnigration and the granting of a preference to skilled aliens. E. HARPER, supra note 16, at 2122; 1979 SENATE REPORT ON IMMIGRATION LAW AND POLICY, supra note 19, at 6-10.
31. Immigration and Nationality Act Amendments of 1965, Pub. L. No. 89-236, 79
Stat. 911.
32. Visas are made available within an overall limitation according to the following
preference categories:
First Preference: Unmarried sons and daughters of U.S. citizens-20% of overall
limitation.
Second Preference: Spouses and unmarried sons and daughters of aliens lawfully admitted for permanent residence-20% of overall limitation plus any numbers not required
COME

for first preference.

Third Preference: Professional persons, or those with specialized ability in science and
the arts-10% of overall limitation.
Fourth Preference: Married children of U.S. citizens-10% of overall limitation plus
any numbers not used by first three preferences.
Fifth Preference: Brothers and sisters of U.S. citizens 21 years of age or older-24% of
overall limitation plus any numbers not used by prior preferences.
Sixth Preference: Skilled and unskilled workers in short supply-10% of overall
limitation.
Seventh Preference: Refugees-6% of overall limitation.
1979 SENATE REPORT ON U.S. IMMIGRATION LAW AND POLICY, supra note 19, at 86. For a
summary of the major provisions of the 1965 amendments, see id. at 56-58. Complete definitions of the seven preference categories are found in § 203(a) of the Immigration and Naturalization Act, 8 U.S.C. § 1153(a) (1976).
33. The 6% limitation (see note 32 supra) means that under the overall limitation of
290,000, only 17,400 refugees may be admitted in any one year. But see notes 34-39 and
accompanying text infra.
34. Immigration and Naturalization Act § 212(d)(5), 8 U.S.C. § 1182(d)(5) (1976).
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tion 212(d)(5), the Attorney General has discretion to admit
refugees under temporary emergency conditions in the public interest.3 5 Although it has been argued that the intent of this section
was to provide relief in individual and urgent cases,", three large
groups of refugees have been admitted under the parole
power-31,870 Hungarian refugees in the years immediately following the 1956 Hungarian revolution;3 7 nearly 420,000 Cuban refugees between 1961 and 1977;s8 and more than 450,000
Vietnamese, Cambodian and Laotian refugees from 1975 through
1980.39
The status of persons admitted under the parole power is tenuous and indeterminate. 40 As a result, legislation has been passed
"The Attorney General may in his discretion parole into the United States temporarily
under such conditions as he may prescribe for emergent reasons or for reasons deemed
strictly in the public interest any alien applying for admission to the United States, but
such parole of such alien shall not be regarded as an admission of the alien and when the
purposes of such parole shall, in the opinion of the Attorney General, have been served the
alien shall forthwith return or be returned to the custody from which he was paroled and
thereafter his case shall continue to be dealt with in the same manner as that of any other
applicant for admission to the United States." Id.
35. Id.
36.

HOUSE SUBCOMM. ON IMMIGRATION AND NATURALIZATION OF THE COMM. ON THE JUDI-

CIARY, STUDY OF POPULATION AND IMMIGRATION PROBLEMS,

88th Cong., 2d Sess. 108, 133

(1964). "[The parole statute] was intended as a remedy for individual hardship cases, no
more, no less." Id. at 160 (remarks of Congressman Feighan). The development and use of
the parole power is discussed in Comment, Refugee-Parolee:The Dilemma of the Indochina
Refugee, 13 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 175, 177-82 (1975).
37. 1979 SENATE REPORT ON IMMIGRATION LAW AND POLICY, supra note 19, at 18. An
additional 6,130 Hungarian refugees were settled under the Refugee Relief Act of 1953. See
note 23 supra.
38. TRANSCENTURY FOUNDATION STUDY, supra note 3, at 66-67 (based on unpublished
data compiled by the Immigration and Naturalization Service). Another 245,000 Cuban refugees came under other categories-as "visitors," later adjusting their status, or as regular
immigrants, thus making the total number of Cuban refugees approach 675,000. Id.
39. Total parole admittees for the period exceed 554,000, not including 135,000 "special entrants" from Cuba and Haiti admitted in 1980, SELECT COMMISSION REPORT, supra
note 15, at 93. See also note 71 infra. Other instances of the use of the parole power to
admit groups of refugees are cited in Comment, Extending the Constitution to RefugeeParolees,15 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 139, 155 (1977); Comment, Refugee-Parolee: The Dilemma
of the Indochina Refugee, 13 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 175, 180-81 (1975).
40. In Leng May Ma v. Barber, 357 U.S. 185 (1958), the Supreme Court ruled that a
parole-admitted alien had not entered the country; as such, he was not entitled to significant statutory and constitutional rights which attach to aliens only upon entry. See also
Shaughnessy v. United States ex rel. Mezei, 345 U.S. 206 (1953) (parolees have a right only
to that due process accorded to them by Congress); Kaplan v. Tod, 267 U.S. 228 (1925);
Wong Hing Fun v. Esperdy, 335 F.2d 656 (2d Cir. 1964) (parolee is "outside" the United
States and is not entitled to assert rights under the Constitution). The constitutional status
of refugee-parolees is examined in Comment, Extending the Constitution to Refugee-Parolees, 15 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 139 (1977) (arguing that the holding in Leng May Ma should not
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periodically to change the status of parolees to that of persons lawfully admitted. 41 The fact that such legislation has been repeatedly
enacted is evidence that parolee status is not "temporary", but
should be acknowledged as a necessary and regularly used provision of the immigration law to engender an immediate response to
changing world conditions.4 2
B. America's
Problem

Response

to

the

Indochinese

Refugee

Almost immediately after the fall of Saigon, President Ford
announced his intention to admit 150,000 refugees from Indochina.43 Subsequently, Congress enacted the Indochina Migration
and Refugee Relief Assistance Act of 197544 to hasten the settlement of refugees in this country. 45 Enacted within the framework
of the Migration and Refugee Relief Assistance Act of 1962,46 the
1975 Act gave the executive branch broad powers with regard to
the admission of refugees to the states.
First, the Act appropriated 455 million dollars to be spent
under the terms of the Migration and Refugee Assistance Act of
1962 for Cambodian and Vietnamese refugees.47 Of this, a sizable
apply to groups of refugees admitted under the parole power). See also United States ex rel.
Paktorovics v. Murff, 260 F.2d 610 (2d Cir. 1958) ("invitee" parolee should come under the
protection of the Constitution, at least for revocation of parole; generally not followed). Cf.
Note, Refugees Under United States Immigration Law, 24 CLEV. ST. L. REv. 528 (1975)
(status of refugees admitted under seventh preference category of the Immigration and Naturalization Act § 203(a)(7), 8 U.S.C. § 1153 (a)(7)). See note 32 supra.
41. Act of July 25, 1958, Pub. L. No. 85-559, 72 Stat. 419 (Hungarians); Act of Nov. 2,
1966, Pub. L. No. 89-732, 80 Stat. 1161 (Cubans); Act of Oct. 28, 1977, Pub. L. No. 95-145,
91 Stat. 1223 (Indochinese); Act of Oct. 5, 1978, Pub. L. No. 95-412, 92 Stat. 907
(Indochinese).
42. Legislation to reform U.S. policy has recently been enacted by Congress. See notes
63-72 and accompanying text infra.
43. Gardner, Congress Nears Final Action on Vietnam Aid, 33 CONG. Q. WE.EKLY REP.
835, 839 (1975). See Greetings for Refugees: From Open Arms to Hostility, U.S. NEWS &
WORLD REP.,

May 5, 1975, at 22-23.

44. Pub. L. No. 94-23, 89 Stat. 87 (1975) (codified at 22 U.S.C. § 2601 (1979)).
45. The legislative history of the Indochina Migration and Refugee Assistance Act of
1975 may be found in H.R. REP. Nos. 197 & 230 and S. REP. No. 119, 94th Cong., 1st Sess.
(1975).
46. Migration and Refugee Relief Assistance Act of 1962, Pub. L. No. 87-510, 76 Stat.
121. Enacted in response to the immigration of the large number of Cuban refugees, this Act
was the first direct appropriation for refugee resettlement. Prior to this Act, refugee funding
was available from the Mutual Security ContingencyYund, at the direction of the President.
The 1962 Act separated refugee assistance from foreign aid legislation and provided a
framework for federal assistance programs for refugees throughout the 1960's and 1970's.
47. Indochina Migration and Refugee Assistance Act of 1975, Pub. L. No. 94-23, § 2,
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portion was made available to state and local agencies as reimbursement for the costs of family assistance and medical benefits
provided under the Aid to Families with Dependent Children
(AFDC) 48 and Medicaid provisions4 9 of the Social Security Act. In
an accompanying bill, Congress appropriated 305 million dollars to
the Department of State and 100 million dollars to the Department of Health, Education and Welfare (HEW) for the resettlement effort.50 Second, the 1975 Act called for ongoing consultation
between the President and various congressional committees, with
periodic reports to Congress regarding the resettlement effort. 51
During the initial phases of operation, refugee resettlement
was coordinated by an inter-agency task force, with representatives
from various executive departments; this task force controlled
evacuation, reception and resettlement activities.2 Later, as many
refugees were admitted to the United States, the focus shifted: domestic responsibilities were transferred to HEW, while the State
Department retained control of contracts with voluntary agencies
and foreign operations. 3 In 1979, President Carter created the office of U.S. Coordinator for Refugee Affairs to provide policy oversight and coordination of both domestic and international
matters.5
Since the passage of the 1975 Indochina Migration and Refugee Assistance Act, Congress has enacted additional legislation to
facilitate the resettlement of refugees. Amendments in 197655
broadened the Act to include refugees from Laos; 1977 amendments adjusted the status of refugees previously admitted under
the parole power to "lawfully admitted, ' 5 once again disregarding
the immigration and naturalization quotas.57
More significantly, the 1977 amendments instituted a proce89 Stat.
48.
49.
50.
51.

87.
42 U.S.C. §§ 601-610 (1976).
42 U.S.C. §§ 1396-97(f) (1976).
Act of May 23, 1975, Pub. L. No. 94-24, 89 Stat. 89.
Indochina Migration and Refugee Relief Assistance Act of 1975, Pub. L. No. 94-23,

§ 4, 89 Stat. 87.
52. See Exec. Order No. 11,860, 40 Fed. Reg. 22,121 (1975).
53.

See 73 DEP'T STATE BULL. 133 (1976) (Task Force Report); 73 DEP'T STATE BULL.

208 (1976) (responsibility for refugee resettlement transferred to HEW); 72 DEP'T

STATE

BULL. 741 (1975).
54. See generally TRANSCENTURY FOUNDATION STUDY, supra note 3, at 38-39, 126-27.

Dick Clark was first appointed to that position.
55. Act of June 21, 1976, Pub. L. No. 94-313, 90 Stat. 691.
56. See note 40 supra.
57. Indochina Migration and Refugee Assistance Act of 1977, Pub. L. No. 95-145, 91
Stat. 1223 (Title I).
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dure to phase down federal assistance to the states over a four-year
period.58 The asserted purpose of this phasedown was to extend
federal assistance in an orderly manner so as to avoid undue impact on the states should the 1975 Act and its accompanying funding terminate. 9 It soon became apparent, however, that such cutbacks would cause severe hardships in many states, and in 1978
Congress suspended the four-year phase-down and temporarily returned to a 100% reimbursement level.60 Congress, at the time,
was made fully aware .of the problem:
[M]ost of these refugees have settled in a few geographic areas
.... [The] national policy, however, creates grave fiscal
problems in those states and localities where refugees have
settled....
The basic premise behind the Indochinese Refugee Assistance Program [is] that the federal government, which determines
immigration policies, should finance state and local
programs....
Now, this federal assistance to lower levels of government is
being phased out, on the assumption that the refugees are becoming setttled and are in less need of special programs. Yet the federal government is continuing to let new refugees in .... [The]
conditions necessitating 100% federal financing . . . still exist.6

Congress' willingness to provide stop-gap relief in 1978 was
coupled with a pledge to re-evaluate and attempt to reformulate
federal immigration and refugee policy. 2 A sixteen-member Select
Commission on Immigration and Refugee Policy was formed in October 197863 to recommend comprehensive legislation concerning
treatment of illegal immigrants, to formulate immigration goals in
the national interest, and to rewrite the Immigration and Naturalization Act to'6 "make
its administration more efficient, equitable
4
and humane.

In the meantime, however, legislation was introduced in the
58. Id. (Title II).
59. See S. REP. No. 95-471, 95th Cong., 1st Sess. 1 (1977).
60. Act of Oct. 30, 1978, Pub. L. No. 95-549, 92 Stat. 2066 (Title II).
61. 124 CONG. REc. H12,787 (daily ed. Oct. 13, 1978, pt. II) (remarks of Rep.
Anderson).
62. See id. at H12,785-87.
63. Act of Oct. 5, 1978, Pub. L. No. 95-412, 92 Stat. 907; see generally 1979 SENATE
REPORT ON IMMIGRATION LAW AND POLICY, supra note 19 at 1-2, 79-83; Fuchs, The Select

Commission on Immigration and Refugee Policy:Development of a FundamentalLegislative Policy, 17 WILLAMETTE L. RE v. 141 (1980) (Mr. Fuchs was the Executive Director of the
commission).
64. Fuchs, supra note 63, at 144.
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Senate6 5 and in the House 6 to deal more directly with the refugee

problem.6 7 Conflicting provisions were resolved in committee and
resulted in the passage of the Refugee Act of 1980.68 Although the
Act attempts to address state and local concerns more directly, to
reflect cooperation with voluntary agencies, 9 and to delineate
functions of various executive departments,7 0 its lack of built-in

controls to adequately respond to state concerns, particularly in
emergency situations, remains a problem. Further, the problem of
handling sudden influxes of large numbers of refugees has apparently not yet been resolved.7 1 Although the report of the Select
Commission, released in March 1981, recommended an increase in
the total number of refugees to be admitted on a year-by-year basis, the members of the Commission still left unanswered questions
concerning the problems caused by parole admissions. 72 Thus, the
problems of parole admittees and the burdens thereby imposed
65. S. 643, 96th Cong., 1st Sess. (1979).
66. H.R. 2816, 96th Cong., 1st Sess. (1979).
67. See Silverman, Indochina Legacy: The Refugee Act of 1980, PUBLIUS, Winter 1980,
at 27.
68. Refugee Act of 1980, Pub. L. No. 96-212, 94 Stat. 102. The Act accomplishes four
basic objectives: (1) introduces a more universal and humanitarian definition of "refugee" in
accordance with international standards; (2) raises the annual limitation on refugees from
17,400 to 50,000; (3) permits admission of additional refugees by the President in response
to conditions of "grave humanitarian concerns," but only after consultation with Congress;
and (4) provides federal support for cash, medical assistance and social services for a period
of eighteen months following entry, and special services for another eighteen months. The
House version, which more closely followed the wishes of the states, would have provided
four years of federal funding. The provisions of the House and Senate versions are compared in Silverman, supra note 67, at 34-39.
69. Silverman, supra note 67, at 39.
70. Id. at 41.
71. Some shortcomings of the Act are discussed in Klement, Carter Helps Refugee
Law Flunk 1st Test, NAT'L L.J., July 7, 1980, at 3, col. 1. In April and May 1980, Castro
permitted more than 130,000 Cuban refugees to emigrate to the United States. Rather than
operating within the provisions of the new Act, however, which requires consultation with
Congress, President Carter created a special immigration category of "entrants," thus conferring indefinite parole status upon those in the "Cuban flotilla." In addition to the failure
to adhere to the consultation provisions of the Act, Klement cites other flaws: first, the Act
offers no clear guide to handling refugees who come directly to the United States rather
than flee first to another country prior to entry. Second, defining refugees as those who have
a "well-founded fear of persecution" fails to address the situation presented by "economic
refugees" of Latin American countries. Finally, the new "entrants" are not "refugees" as
defined in the Act. Thus, no federal refugee funding benefits flow under the provisions of
the Act, and the costs of admitting these refugees are borne by state and local governments.
72. SELECT COMMISSION REPORT, supra note 15, at 158-60. Rather than impose restrictions on the number of refugees admitted, the Commission preferred the provisions of the
1980 Act, permitting the number of refugees to be admitted to be set in response to changing world conditions. Id.
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upon the states remain.
C.

Current Refugee Resettlement Procedures

The admission of refugees under the parole power
eventual resettlement in the United States involves the
tion of four executive departments 73 and a number of
agencies (VOLAGs).7 4 The procedure currently followed

and their
coordinavoluntary
is an out-

73. See generally TRANSCENTURY FOUNDATION STUDY, supra note 3, at 33-39. The
State Department has responsibility for the housing and transportation of the refugees
while overseas, and for the formulation of national policy. Much of its work is in cooperation
with international organizations such as the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR), the Red Cross, and the Intercontinental Committee for European Migration
(ICEM). See notes 76-81 and accompanying text infra. From 1975 to 1979, State Department appropriations for refugees totaled $513.1 million. U.S. COMPTROLLER GENERAL, RESPONSE TO THE INDOCHINESE EXODUS-A HUMANITARIAN DILEMMA 100 (1979).
The Justice Department assists the State Department in the selection process, and the
Attorney General has the parole power to admit refugees. See notes 34-42 and accompanying text supra. The Immigration and Naturalization Service screens refugees both overseas
and at ports of entry, and processes requests for changes of immigrant status.
The Department of Health, Education and Welfare (HEW) funds welfare, health and
educational benefits to refugees. This takes the form of reimbursement to states for AFDC
and Medicaid costs, although there are some directly funded programs. See notes 83-87 and
accompanying text infra. See generally DEPT. OF H.E.W., ANNUAL REPORT OF H.E.W. ON THE
INDOCHINESE REFUGEE ASSISTANCE PROGRAM

(Dec. 31, 1978), reprinted in 1979 Senate Judi-

ciary Comm. Hearings, supra note 1, at 234-396. From 1975 to 1979, HEW appropriations
for refugee assistance totaled $505.2 million.
The Department of Defense assisted in the initial stages of the Indochinese Refugee
program; generally, it has the resources to move large groups of refugees and house them
until civilian agencies can take over. From April to December 1975, the Department of Defense was responsible for transporting 130,000 Indochinese refugees to temporary resettlement camps in the United States and Guam; later, they were settled throughout the country. The division of HEW into the Department of Health and Human Services and the
Department of Education has realigned the provision of services to refugees. A recent summary may be found in SELECT COMMISSION REPORT, supra note 15, at 426-27 (the role of the
federal government in immigration and refugee policy).
74. Voluntary agencies (VOLAGs) have been an integral part of refugee resettlement
since World War II. Through contacts with people in local communities, the VOLAGs are
able to raise funds and to generate support for refugee resettlement efforts. No VOLAG
involved in Indochinese refugee resettlement is primarily Asian. Many are religious organizations (e.g., Church World Service, U.S. Catholic Conference). One state (Iowa) is a VOLAG; other states have been VOLAGs in the past, but are no longer active in that role.
TRANSCENTuRY FOUNDATION STUDY,

supra note 3, at 119. Other VOLAGs have been tradi-

tionally oriented toward particular ethnic groups (e.g., American Fund for Czechoslovak
Refugees), but are now active in settling Indochinese refugees. "It is a continuing challenge
to the resettlement agencies to adapt to the changing complexion of refugee movements in a
manner which promotes cross-cultural appreciation rather than antipathy or paternalism."
Id. at 42.
Under contracts with the State Department, VOLAGs currently receive from $300 to
$500 per refugee; they are expected to match these grants with funds raised from other
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growth of the one developed after the Second World War, which
has assisted the settlement
of more than two million refugees in
75
the United States.
1.

Pre-entry

Initial processing procedures require the coordinated efforts of
a number of international, governmental and voluntary agencies.
All refugees are interviewed under the auspices of the United Nations High Commissioner on Refugees, 76 which ascertains a refugee's desired country of settlement. The primary determination of
a refugee's admissibility is made by the United States Immigration
and Naturalization Service (INS) in the country of origin or, in the
case of Indochinese refugees, in one of the refugee camps in Southeast Asia. Refugees are assigned to categories of eligibility and
then are approved for entry either under the regular immigration
7
quotas or under the parole power of the Attorney General.
Data are then prepared on the refugees by the Joint Voluntary
Agency Representatives (JVAR) and are sent to the American
Council of Voluntary Agencies in New York which distributes the
cases among the various VOLAGs. 7 Generally, VOLAGs accept
relatives of refugees previously settled by that agency, and other
refugees are selected on the basis of offers of sponsorship.
A basic premise of United States refugee policy is that refugees are settled only when a sponsoring group or family can be
found to assume responsibility for the refugee's integration into society. Once a VOLAG receives an assurance of sponsorship (by an
individual or group), the refugees are transported to the United
sources. Id. at 119. The recognized advantages of using VOLAGs in resettlement include the
VOLAGs' reliance on volunteers (resulting in decreased costs), their involvement of local
groups in the resettlement process, and their non-political nature. 1979 Senate Judiciary
Comm. Hearings,supra note 1, at 46 (statement of American Council of Voluntary Agencies
for Foreign Service, Inc.).
75. 1979 Senate JudiciaryComm. Hearings,supra note 1, at 193.
76. Established in 1951, the office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) is charged with providing legal protection to refugees in general and with
establishing a permanent solution to each refugee situation. The UNHCR coordinates refugee resettlement in various countries around the world. See generally WORLD REFUGEE CRIsis, supra note 4, at 269-84. Present estimates of the world's refugee population range from
8.1 to 10.8 million. Id. at 13. The office of the UNHCR is funded in part by the United
Nations general budget and in part by voluntary contributions from member nations.
United States funding is included under State Department appropriations. See note 73
supra.
77. See notes 32-36 and accompanying text supra.
78. 1979 Senate Judiciary Comm. Hearings, supra note 1, at 46-47 (report of American Council of Voluntary Agencies for Foreign Service, Inc.).
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States by the Intergovernmental Committee for European Migration (ICEM). 79 Funds for transporation are advanced by the
VOLAGs and/or ICEM, but the refugees sign a promise to repay
these costs.8 0 Most of ICEM's funding, however, comes from contributions of member nations to the ICEM budget.8
2. Post-entry

Once within the United States, .refugees are placed within a
community by the VOLAGs who, with the sponsor, arrange for
housing, schooling, employment, language training, and other

needs. VOLAGs and sponsors, although not under a legal obligation, recognize their moral obligation to assist refugees and provide
needed services. s2
Of course, it is hoped that refugees eventually will be assimi-

lated into their new communities and will become self-sufficient.
Recognizing that this process will take time, the federal government makes aid available to refugees through the Department of
Health and Human Services (HHS).8 s This aid is primarily given

in the form of reimbursement to the states of 100% of the
nonfederal costs of cash assistance and Medicaid benefits.8 4 Additional funds are available for support services through grants to
state and private agencies for special refugee services such as Eng-

lish training, employment counseling and training, and mental
health services. 8 5 Funds are also made available to schools where

79. Id. According to its constitution, ICEM is "concerned with the migration of refugees for whom arrangements may be made between ICEM and the governments of the countries concerned." Its chief emphases are family reunification, refugee migration, and lan-

guage training.

WORLD REFUGEE CRISIS,

supra note 4, at 296-300.

80. "[T]he refugee thereby retains his dignity, self-confidence and the idea that he
carried some of the burden of his family's resettlement." 1979 Senate Judiciary Comm.
Hearings, supra note 1, at 47. Although repayment may take years, the repayment rate is
generally excellent. Id.
81. The United States' contribution to ICEM for 1978 was $11,434,000; total ICEM
expenditures for Indochinese refugees were projected at $14.9 and $15.2 million for 1979 and

1980, respectively. WORLD REFUGEE CRISIS, supra note 4, at 299-300.
82. See TRANSCENTURY FOUNDATION STUDY, supra note 3, at 119-20.
83. Id. at 118. This aid is approximately $2,950 per capita for HHS-sponsored
programs.
84. Section 2(a)(2) of the Indochina Migration and Refugee Assistance Act of 1975
provides: "Funds appropriated under this Act shall be made available to State or local public agencies to reimburse them for the non-Federal share of costs under Titles IV and XIX
of the Social Security Act. [42 U.S.C. §§ 601-44, §§ 1396-97(f)] for the provision of cash or
medical assistance to aliens who have fled from Cambodia, Vietnam or Laos." 22 U.S.C. §
2601 (1976).

85.

See

TRANSCENTURY FOUNDATION STUDY,

supra note 3, at 113-16. HEW Special

Project Grants and Purchase of Service Agreements are listed in DEPT. OF H.E.W.,

ANNUAL
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there is a considerable refugee impact,"6 and programs provide
funds for the settlement of "unaccompanied minors" (orphans). 7
D.

Effect of Federal Refugee Resettlement Policy

The legislative history of the 1975 Act evidences a dual awareness: first, the contribution of refugees to the development of the
United States; 8 and second, the potentially detrimental impact of
settling refugees in economically hard-pressed areas.89 Thus, a
stated goal of the Act was to disperse refugees throughout the
country.9 0
There is evidence that Congress regarded the refugees as a

federal responsibility. "Until the impact of the arrival of the Indochina refugees has been absorbed, the costs of assisting them in
entering productive lives should be borne largely by the Federal
government." ' Thus federal funding was felt to be the "only reaH.E.W. ON THE INDOCHINESE REFUGEE ASSISTANCE PROGRAM 83-130 (Dec. 31,
1978), reprinted in 1979 Senate Judiciary Comm. Hearings, supra note 1, at 314-62.
86. See TRANSCENTURY FOUNDATION STUDY, supra note 3, at 114-15. Identifiable Office
of Education expenditures for refugees have virtually ceased, however. Id. at 125.
87. Id. at 116-18.
88. The Senate Report proclaimed, "One of the great strengths of this country is the
diversity of its people. It is a nation of refugees ....
Help to [Indochinese refugees] is in
the finest tradition of America. There is no better way for Americans to reaffirm what this
REPORT OF

country stands for. . .

."

S. REP. No. 94-119, 94th Cong., 1st Sess. 2-3 (1975).

89. Id. at 4; H.R. REP. No. 94-197, 94th Cong., 1st Sess. 4 (1975). Implicit in the legislative history is the assumption that the executive branch (specifically the Department of
Health, Education and Welfare) would "develop procedures to insure that local communities will not be adversey [sic] affected by the resettlement of refugees." Id. at 10.
90. The intent was to avoid a repeat of the Cuban refugee influx, which resulted in
approximately 750,000 refugees settling in Dade County, Florida, in and around the City of
Miami from 1969 to 1977. See TRANSCENTURY FOUNDATION STUDY, supra note 3, at 66-69.
The tremendous strain placed by Cuban refugees on local welfare systems was the impetus
for increased federal funding; from 1969 to 1979, and including 1980 budget estimates, federal expenditures for Cuban refugee programs approached $1.4 billion, or about $1,861 per
refugee. See id. at 70-80. Although in 1978 Congress finally approved a phase-down of the
assistance program over the next six years, the continued ability of Dade County to circumvent cutbacks may be based in part on "fortuitous committee assignments of its legislators
in Washington"-i.e., on the Senate and House Appropriations Committees. Id. at 84. The
recent additional influx of more than 130,000 Cuban refugees in early 1980 has intensified
the problem. See generally Open Heart, Open Arms, TIME, May 19, 1980, at 14-18; Impatient for Freedom, TIME, June 16, 1980, at 29; The Welcome Wears Thin, TIME, Sept. 1,
1980, at 8-10.
91. 123 CONG. REC. 33,067 (1977) (remarks of Sen. Cranston). The Select Commission
on Immigration and Refugee Policy agreed: "If the United States intentionally admits a
group of refugees, it should, in turn, help these people overcome any liabilities that are
linked to their refugee status so that they can quickly become productive, participating
members of society." SELECT COMMISSION REPORT, supra note 15, at 177.
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sonable means of relief for State and local governments with more
than their share of refugees." 2
In spite of Congress' declared intent to settle refugees
throughout the country and avoid burdening any one locale, the
means adopted have not been adequately monitored. As a result,
several states have received a substantially disproportionate share
of the Indochinese refugee population, 3 due to initial settlement
efforts and subsequent secondary migration. 4 The erratic nature
of admissions and settlements 5 often has placed an increased burden on state administrative procedures, and the states have not
been silent. Oregon, for instance, noting that it had received three
times its proportionate share of refugees measured against its non92. 123 CONG. REC. 34,088 (1977) (remarks of Rep. McFall).
93. In 1980, the states with the largest Indochinese refugee populations were California (145,486), Texas (38,516), and Washington (19,774). SELECT COMMISsION REPORT, supra
note 15, at 184. Louisiana, Pennsylvania and Virginia also received disproportionate shares.
See DEPT. OF HEW INDOCHINA REFUGEE PROGRAM, REPORT TO THE CONGRESS (1978) (Table
2); the data are summarized in TRANSCENTURY FOUNDATION STUDY, supra note 3, at 179-87.
94. Secondary migration occurs when refugees move subsequent to resettlement; it is
estimated that at least 20% of the refugees engage in secondary migration. Interview with
Arnold Munoz, Deputy Director, Department of Social Services, State of California (November, 1979). An estimate of secondary migration from 1978 to 1979 is found in SELECT
COMMISSION REPORT, supra note 15, at 187. Primary targets of secondary migration are existing refugee communities in Texas, Louisiana and Southern California. TRANSCENTURY
FOUNDATION STUDY, supra note 3, at 179-87. "Given the size of this secondary migration. . .
it appears that a general dispersal policy may have been ill-advised . . . consideration

should have been given to the development of clustered resettlement opportunities." Id. at
124. Such secondary migration makes estimating the number of refugees in any state nearly
impossible. In 1979, for instance, the INS Alien Report showed 70,960 refugees in California,

but INS estimates do not include secondary migrants; Department of Health, Education
and Welfare officials, however, "unofficially estimated" that 110,000 refugees were within
California. CALIFORNIA ASSEMBLY COMM. ON HUMAN RESOURCES, FINDINGS, (Sept. 1979) at 1.
Secondary migration may be more prevalent in states with higher welfare benefit levels;
secondary migrants are often less employable and need additional services. "The characteristics of.

.

. secondary migrants.

. .

present special problems for present and future reset-

tlement efforts. Region IX [western U.S.] is getting the 'hard core' unemployed from other
states-those who have found it particularly difficult to acquire the minimal language and
job skill proficiencies." DEPT.

OF

H.E.W.,

REPORT TO THE CONGRESS,

INDOCHINESE REFUGEE

ASSISTANCE PROGRAM 74 (Dec. 31, 1978), reprinted in 1979 Senate JudiciaryComm. Hearings, supra note 1, at 234, 306. See also Huge Rise in Refugees on Welfare Here, S.F.
Chronicle, Feb. 26, 1980, at 1, col. 6.
95. Refugees have been paroled into the United States in varying numbers-133,000 in

the spring of 1975, 11,000 in 1976, 15,000 in 1977, and 7,000 during the first half of 1978.
There have been subsequent parole admissions of 25,000 from June 1978 to May 1979, and

the parole of an additional 21,875 was announced in December 1978. 1979 Senate Judiciary
Comm. Hearings, supra note 1, at 12 (statement of Dick Clark). Additional data may be
found in SELECT COMMISSION REPORT, supra note 15, at 93. Even after admission to the
United States, however, the early refugees were held at resettlement centers until sponsors
could be found.
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refugee population, complained, "the State of Oregon was unwittingly put in the position of having to respond after the fact to
each new group of refugees to be admitted. As a result, staff and
program accommodations were rushed, compromising both their
responsiveness and their effectiveness.""
In addition to problems occasioned by disproportionate dispersal of refugees, current programs raise additional problems for
the states. First, even though voluntary agencies obtain sponsors
for refugees and provide other services, such sponsorship imposes
no legal responsibility. In the event of withdrawal or cessation of
support by the sponsor, or relocation by the refugee family, state
and local 7 welfare benefit systems must assume the burden of their
9
support.
Second, although INS requires the annual registration of refugees, it is apparent that a large number of refugees are not
counted. Estimates of California's refugee population in 1979, for
example, ranged from 70,960 (INS) to 110,000 (HEW unofficial estimate)., 8 Thus, it is difficult to measure the need for cash assistance and for other refugee programs. Although state agencies usually have information on the number of refugees receiving cash
assistance, without an accurate determination of the total number
of refugees it is impossible to evaluate needs in terms of percentage of total population.19
A third factor which has an undetermined impact on the
states is that HHS reimbursement is based on the benefits provided by a particular state's welfare programs. States have discretion to set requirements for welfare benefits in these programs; as
96. 1979 Senate Judiciary Comm. Hearings,supra note 1, at 165 (statement of Leo T.
Hegstrom, Director, Oregon State Department of Human Resources).
97. Id. There are indications that because of the high level of assistance, many refugees are opting for continuing financial aid rather than entering the work force. Id. at 130.
See also SELECT COMMISSION REPORT, supra note 15, at 181.
98. CALIF. ASSEMBLY COMM. ON HUMAN RESOURCES, FINDINGS (Sept. 1979) at 1. By
1981, nearly 40% of the nation's 455,000 Indochinese Refugees were settled in California.
Refugees-Who Will Pay?, S.F. Examiner, Mar. 30, 1981, at B2, col. 1.
99. Although the actual number of refugees receiving assistance may be known, an
underestimate of the total refugees in a state results in a distortion of the percentage needing assistance and lessens the state's ability to meet the needs of its refugee population as
well as those of its other residents. "[T]here is no precise way to measure the movements of
refugees within the United'States. Particularly for states receiving significant refugee inflows from interstate migrations, such as California, Texas, Louisiana, or Washington, the
population figures may be underestimated and the percentage receiving cash assistance
overestimated." CALIF. ASSEMBLY COMM. ON HUMAN RESOURCES, FINDINGS (Sept. 1979) at 2,
quoting U.S. COMPTROLLER GENERAL, RESPONSE TO THE INDOCHINESE EXODUS-A HUMANITARIAN DILEMMA (1979).
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a result, the cash and medical benefits to which refugees are entitled may vary.100 Whether refugees move from one state to another
in order to take advantage of increased assistance benefits has not
been determined. There are indications, however, that refugees
seek shelter in more generous jurisdictions. 10 1 As a result, California and other states have requested a uniform federally administered cash and medical
assistance program to relieve the increasing
10 2
burden on the states.

A final factor affecting states' abilities to meet increasing refugee demands has been the delay inherent in the federal funding
and appropriations process along with a lack of predictability as to
which funds may be available to implement necessary programs. 03
Because of uncertainties in funding, many states have been unable
to set up programs in language and vocational training, since these
often involve contracts with private agencies. Although these are
the very programs needed to make refugees self-sufficient, less
than 20% of the available
funds are invested in such human re04
source development.

In hearings on the Indochinese Refugee Program, the California Assembly Committee on Human Resources commented on
these problems: "There can be no program development and planning with uncertainties in federal authorization or appropriation
for the program, or uncertainties in the number of refugees needing cash assistance and social services. "105 The indecision and in100.

In 1979, California's AFDC monthly grant to a family of four was $487; in Illinois,

the state program provided $267. DEPT.

OF

H.E.W.,

CHARACTERISTICS OF STATE PLANS FOR

AFDC (4/78), data compiled by Calif. Assembly Comm. on Human Resources (Sept. 14,
1979).
101. See Huge Rise in Refugees on Welfare Here, S.F. Chronicle, Feb. 26, 1980, at 1,
col. 6, noting that in San Francisco, 17% of the refugees on welfare had lived in other states,
and 45% of those were not previously receiving aid.
102. CALIF. ASSEMBLY COMM. ON HUMAN RESOURCES, RECOMMENDATIONS AND FINDINGS
ON THE INDOCHINESE REFUGEE ASSISTANCE PROGRAM 4 (1979) (R. Alatore, Chmn.). The presence of high welfare benefits is only one factor in secondary migration, however. Guam and
Hawaii, for example, with generous welfare policies, have not experienced significant secondary migration, while Texas and Louisiana, with "frigid welfare policies," have had a significant amount. TRANSCENTURY FOUNDATION STUDY, supra note 3, at 130 n.34.
103. For instance, Congress has authorized funds for education of Indochinese children but has not appropriated them in recent years; there was a five-month interruption in
HEW-IRAP funding in the winter of 1978; when plans for a phase-down in funding, see
notes 58-61 and accompanying text supra, were dropped, funding was authorized only
through September, 1979; many voluntary agencies did not receive placement grants from
State Department funds for refugees placed in the spring and summer of 1979. TRANsCENTURY FOUNDATION STUDY,

104.
105.

supra note 3, at 125.

Id. at 43-45, 124-25.
CALIF. ASSEMBLY COMM.

ON HUMAN RESOURCES, RECOMMENDATIONS AND FINDINGS
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definiteness of federal funding for state refugee programs has seriously impaired states' abilities to meet the demands of an
indeterminate refugee population and, to a lesser extent, their
nonrefugee population, for necessary social services.
Although Congress expressly declared an intent to avoid an
adverse impact on the states in settling the refugees, 106 it has been
unsuccessful. Its attempt to disperse refugees widely has led to
more secondary migration, as refugees move to states (particularly
California, Louisiana and Texas) which have a larger Indochinese
population, milder, more favorable climate, and perhaps better
welfare benefits. 0 7 By refusing to appropriate funds for needed
programs, Congress has left the states unable to help refugees become self-sufficient through English language training and job opportunity programs.1°s
In addition, certain refugee populations by their very nature
increase the states' burdens. The most recent refugee parolees are
less educated than their predecessors; most do not speak English,
and many are illiterate in their native language. 09 Public health
facilities are now being taxed by the influx of people with tuberculosis and other tropical diseases." 0 The magnitude of such adverse
impacts on the states raises federalism questions-that is, to what
extent are the states protected from actions of the federal government which impose enormous financial and social burdens on the
states and impede or impair the functioning of necessary state
programs?
1 (1979) (R. Alatore, Chmn.). "[D]elays
in the federal appropriation bill have made the Indochina Refugee Assistance Program a
nightmare to administer." Id. (emphasis added).
106. See notes 89-92 and accompanying text supra.
107. See notes 93-102 and accompanying text supra.
108. See notes 103-05 and accompanying text supra. The Select Commission Report
acknowledged these problems and weaknesses as well as others, noting generally that many
communities do not receive the financial assistance necessary to cover the increased burdens
placed by refugees on community services, and that dependence on cash assistance programs prevents refugees from becoming self-sufficient within three years. SELECT COMMISSION REPORT, supra note 15, at 181-84.
ON THE INDOCHINESE REFUGEE ASSISTANCE PROGRAM

109. CALIF. ASSEMBLY COMM. ON HUMAN RESOURCES, RECOMMENDATIONS AND FINDINGS
ON THE INDOCHINESE REFUGEE ASSISTANCE PROGRAM 3 (1979). It is estimated that fewer than

10% of the refugees currently entering the United States speak English, thus decreasing
their chances of finding employment.

110. See CALIF. ASSEMBLY COMM. ON HEALTH, EXCERPTS FROM HEARING ON HEALTH
PROBLEMS OF INDOCHINA REFUGEES (Aug. 10, 1979), and COMMITTEE RECOMMENDATIONS. See
also notes 214-18 and accompanying text infra.
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II. The Tenth Amendment as a Basis for
Enforcing State Rights
The Constitution envisioned a federal system of states, each
retaining vestiges of individual sovereignty, but delegating specific
powers to the federal government.
In the compound republic of America, the power surrendered by
the people is first divided between two distinct governments, and
then the portion allotted to each subdivided among distinct and
separate departments. Hence a double security arises to the rights
of the people. Thedifferent governments will control each other;
at the same time that each will be controlled by itself."'
"Federalism" is descriptive of a dual system of government, in
which power is divided between the states and the national government, based upon the premise that the powers of the federal government are "enumerated"-that is, specifically granted to it by
the Constitution-and that those powers not so delegated are reserved to the states.112 Recently, the Supreme Court observed:
"Our Federalism"

. .

. is a system in which there is sensitivity to

the legitimate interests of both State and National Governments,
and in which the National Government, anxious though it may be
to vindicate and protect federal rights and federal interests, always endeavors to do so in ways that will not unduly interfere
with the legitimate activities of the States. 113
The Tenth Amendment 14 has been called a representation of
the understanding the Framers had of the proper balance between
federal and state interests in the government"15-one which left
the states free to experiment and thus to provide variety within
the federal system. 116 In modern Constitutional jurisprudence,
however, the import of the Tenth Amendment has been dismissed
with the comment that it "states but a truism that all is retained
111. THE FEDERALIST No. 51 (J. Madison).
112. See generally Wechsler, The Political Safeguardsof Federalism:The Role of the
States in the Composition and Selection of the National Government, 54 COLUM. L. REv.
543 (1954); Corwin, The Passing of Dual Federalism, 36 VA. L. REv. 1 (1950).
113. Younger v. Harris, 401 U.S. 37, 44 (1971).
114. "The powers not delegated to the United States by the Constitution, nor prohibited by it to the States, are reserved to the States respectively, or to the people." U.S.
CONsT. amend. X.
115. United States v. Darby, 312 U.S. 100, 124 (1941).
116. The policy of experimentation has long been acknowledged: "It is one of the
happy incidents of the federal system that a single courageous State may, if its citizens
choose, serve as a laboratory; and try novel social and economic experiments without risk to
the rest of the country." New State Ice Co. v. Liebmann, 285 U.S. 262, 311 (1932) (Brandeis,
J., dissenting).
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which has not been surrendered."11 7 Thus, for more than forty

years it has not been a vehicle for protecting state interests.
Commentators have noted a trend in recent Supreme Court
decisions showing greater deference to state interests." s This correlates, perhaps, with increasing public disenchantment with centralized power and with the resulting desire for more autonomous
local governmental systems. 19 Decisions such as Edelman v. Jor12
122
dan,120 Younger v. Harris,
1 Oregon v. Mitchell,
Dandridge v.

Williams,"23 and others, 24 reflect the Court's increasing deference
to state autonomy, leading to its most recent articulation of Tenth
Amendment rights in National League of Cities v. Usery.'25 The
remainder of this note will consider the implications of this case
upon federal refugee resettlement legislation and upon the broader
issue of 1federal-state
conflicts inherent in federally funded
26
programs.

117. United States v. Darby, 312 U.S. 100, 124 (1941).
118. See generally Tribe, Unravelling National League of Cities: The New Federalism
and Affirmative Rights to Essential Governmental Services, 90 HARV. L. REv. 1065 (1977);
Gelfand, The Burger Court and the New Federalism:PreliminaryReflections on the Roles
of Local Government Actors in the Political Dramas of the 1980's, 21 B.C. L. REV. 763
(1980).
119. Tribe, supra note 118, at 1068-69.
120. 415 U.S. 651 (1974) (Eleventh Amendment bars retroactive liability for damages
payable from the state treasury).
121. 401 U.S. 37 (1971) (federal courts are precluded by considerations of equity, comity and federalism from enjoining pending state criminal prosecution except in extraordinary circumstances). See also the extension of Younger in Samuels v. Mackell, 401 U.S. 66
(1971); Huffman v. Pursue, Ltd., 420 U.S. 592 (1975); Doran v. Salem Inn, Inc., 422 U.S. 922
(1975); Juidice v. Vail, 430 U.S. 327 (1977).
122. 400 U.S. 112 (1970) (18 year-old minimum-age requirement of 1970 voting rights
amendment not valid for state and local elections).
123. 397 U.S. 471 (1970) (state may impose limit on maximum monthly grant under
AFDC).
124. See Tribe, supra note 118, at 1068-69, nn.18 & 19 and cases cited therein; Beaird
& Ellington, A Commerce Power Seesaw: Balancing National League of Cities, 11 GA. L.
REv. 35, 47 (1976).
125. 426 U.S. 833 (1976).
126. In examining state sovereignty in the federal-state counterbalance, the Court recently has been blurring the lines between the Tenth and Eleventh Amendments. Under the
Eleventh Amendment, state sovereignty embraces the entire scope of state activity and determines when suit may be brought against a state in federal court. "The very object and
purpose of the 11th Amendment were to prevent the indignity of subjecting a State to the
coercive process of judicial tribunals at the instance of private parties." In re Ayers, 123 U.S.
443, 505 (1887). See also Edelman v. Jordan, 415 U.S. 651 (1974). In contrast, a state's
Tenth Amendment sovereignty more properly might be considered its "affirmative constitutional right, inherent in its capacity as a State, to be free from such congressionally asserted
authority," Fry v. United States, 421 U.S. 542, 553 (1975) (Rehnquist, J., dissenting), and
should be compared to rights of individuals as limitations on Congressional authority. See,
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National League of Cities v. Usery

In 1976, the Supreme Court gave new teeth to the Tenth
Amendment. In National League of Cities v. Usery,2 7 the Court
struck down Congress' extension of the Fair Labor Standards Act
(FLSA) 25 to state and municipal governments, ruling that "insofar
as the challenged amendments operate to directly displace the
States' freedom to structure integral operations in areas of traditional governmental functions, they are not within the authority
granted Congress by [the commerce clause]. 12 9
Justice Rehnquist, writing for a four-vote plurality, held that
the effect of the amendments was to "substantially restructure
traditional ways in which local governments had arranged their affairs,"18 0 an impermissible interference with "the integral governmental functions of [state and local governments]." 13' The FLSA
amendments would have required the states to apply federal minimum wage and overtime standards to state employees. The Court
found significant the increased costs to the states, ' and the fact
that the increase in wages might necessitate curtailment or elimination of state and local programs and services. s3
The Court affirmed the sovereign rights of the states:
e.g., United States v. Jackson, 390 U.S. 570 (1968) (Sixth Amendment right to jury trial);
Leary v. United States, 395 U.S. 6 (1969) (Fifth Amendment due process guarantees).
While the Eleventh Amendment generally applies in suits by a citizen against a state,
recent cases in which it has been asserted have also referred to "the residuum of sovereignty" preserved by the Tenth Amendment. See, e.g., Milliken v. Bradley, 433 U.S. 267,
291 (1977); Fitzpatrick v. Bitzer, 427 U.S. 445 (1976); National League of Cities v. Usery,
426 U.S. 833 (1976). One author has concluded that due to "historical accident," "the eleventh amendment has served as a pseudonym for a great many tenth amendment cases."
Heldt, The Tenth Amendment Iceberg, 30 HASTINGS L.J. 1763, 1795-96 (1979). However,
National League of Cities provides a basis for the Court to develop and expand the rights of
states. See id. at 1796.
127. 426 U.S. 833 (1976).
128. The Fair Labor Standards Act of 1938, 29 U.S.C. §§ 201-219, originally did not
apply to states and their political subdivisions. In 1974, however, the Act was amended, and
the wage, hour and equal pay provisions were made applicable to the states. Pub. L. No. 93259, 88 Stat. 55 (1974).
129. 426 U.S. at 852 (footnote omitted). The commerce clause is one of the enumerated powers of article I, section 8 of the Constitution, which gives Congress the power "[t]o
regulate Commerce with foreign Nations, and among the several States, and with the Indian
Tribes." U.S. CONST., art. 1, § 8, cl. 3.
130. 426 U.S. at 849. Justice Rehnquist was joined by Justices Stewart and Powell and
by Chief Justice Burger. Justice Blackmun concurred in a separate opinion. 426 U.S. at 856.
See notes 152-53 and accompanying text infra.
131. 426 U.S. at 851.
132. Id. at 846.
133. Id. at 847.
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We have repeatedly recognized that there are attributes of sovereignty attaching to every state government which may not be impaired by Congress, not because Congress may lack an affirmative
grant of legislative authority to reach the matter, but because the
prohibits it from exercising the authority in that
Constitution
34
manner.1
Citing Coyle v. Smith,13 5 the Court noted attributes of state sovereignty such as the power to locate the seat of state government and
the power to structure its government in a particular way.136 To
the extent that the amendments
disrupted "integral governmental
37
functions," they were invalid.1
Certain areas of traditional governmental services are specifically within the states' sovereign sphere, the opinion noted. These
areas include fire prevention, police protection, sanitation, public
health, and parks and recreation.""8 "Indeed, it is functions such as
these which governments are created to provide, services such as
these which the States have traditionally afforded their
citizens."' 9
The Court summarily overruled Maryland v. Wirtz, 140 which
had upheld the extension of the FLSA to state-operated hospitals,
public schools and public health care institutions. By so doing, the
Court implied that these functions are also within the scope of the
states' Tenth Amendment protection."" In fact, Rehnquist admitted that the functions listed were "obviously not an exhaustive catalogue of the numerous line and support activities which are well
within the area of traditional operations of state and local governallowing for future judicial expansion and
ments,"' 42 thus
43
modification.
Justice Brennan dissented, 4 4 protesting the Court's decision
134. Id. at 845.
135. 221 U.S. 559 (1911) (Congress could not condition Oklahoma's admission to the
Union upon a promise not to relocate the state capitol).
136. 426 U.S. at 845.
137. Id. at 851.
138. Id.
139. Id.
140. 392 U.S. 183 (1968).
141. See Amersbach v. City of Cleveland, 598 F.2d 1033, 1036 (6th Cir. 1979), discussed in text accompanying notes 174-89 infra.
142. 426 U.S. at 851, n.16.
143. Since its decision in NationalLeague of Cities, the Court has done little to clarify its definition. See notes 250-61 and accompanying text infra.
144. 426 U.S. at 856 (Brennan, J., dissenting). Justice Brennan was joined by Justices
White and Marshall; Justice Stevens filed a separate dissenting opinion. 426 U.S. at 880
(Stevens, J., dissenting).
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as being without precedent. The decision, he claimed, totally undermined traditional commerce clause jurisprudence, and was "an
abstraction without substance, founded neither in the words of the
Constitution nor on precedent."14 5 He challenged the Court's assertion that the Tenth Amendment is a limitation on congressional
exercise of delegated powers 146 and termed the decision "a transparent cover for invalidating a congressional judgment with which
they [the majority] disagree' 147 and "an ipse dixit reflecting nothing but displeasure with a congressional judgment."' 4 8 Brennan attacked the integral governmental function test as conceptually unworkable 14 and chastized the majority for its failure to make any
meaningful distinctions between state-operated railroads (not integral) 150 and state-operated schools, hospitals, and police and fire
departments."'
Justice Blackmun, although joining the majority opinion, filed
a brief concurrence,' 52 acknowledging the possibly troublesome implications noted by Justice Brennan, but viewing the majority
opinion as "adopt[ing] a balancing approach, [which] does not outlaw federal power in areas such as environmental protection, where
the federal interest is demonstrably greater and where state facility compliance with imposed federal standards would be essential."' 53 However, it has been noted that nowhere in the majority
54
opinion was there any reference to a "balancing approach."'
B. The Aftermath of National League of Cities
The scope of the holding in National League of Cities has
been limited. It is the only Supreme Court decision invalidating
congressional action on Tenth Amendment principles. One writer
has hoped it will remain the only one,' 55 fearing that further invali145. Id. at 860.
146. Id. at 862, citing Gibbons v. Ogden, 22 U.S. (9 Wheat.) 1, 196 (1824) and McCulloch v. Maryland, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 316 (1819).
147. 426 U.S. at 867 (footnote omitted).
148. Id. at 872.
149. Id. at 880.
150. The majority expressly refused to overrule United States v. California, 297 U.S.
175 (1936), which upheld congressional regulation under the commerce clause of a stateoperated railroad. 426 U.S. at 854-55 n.18.
151. 426 U.S. at 880 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
152. Id. at 856 (Blackmun, J., concurring).
153. Id.
154. See notes 248-50 and accompanying text infra.
155. Barber, National League of Cities v. Usery: New Meaning for the Tenth Amendment?, 1976 Sup. CT. REV. 161.
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dation of congressional legislation could lead to a crisis reminiscent
of the Lochner era where the Court repeatedly invalidated New
Deal economic legislation on substantive due process grounds.5 6
Although lower federal courts have tended to limit the decision to
its facts, 57 refusing to abandon traditional concepts of commerce
clause jurisprudence and federal supremacy,1 58 state courts have
embraced it as an affirmation of their inherent authority and
power.1 59
156. See id. at 176-82. See generally J. NOWAK, R. ROTUNDA & J. YOUNG, HANDBOOK
397-404 (1978). See also Schecter Poultry Corp. v. United States,
295 U.S. 495 (1935); Lochner v. New York, 198 U.S. 45 (1905).
157. See, e.g., North Carolina ex rel Morrow v. Califano, 445 F.Supp. 532 (E.D.N.C.
1977), aff'd 435 U.S. 962 (1978) (National Health Planning Act requiring state to establish
and restructure agencies held not a significant enough infringement on state sovereignty,
even though state constitution would have to be amended); New Hampshire Dep't of Employment Security v. Marshall, 616 F.2d 240 (1st Cir. 1980) (Federal Unemployment Tax
Act amendments not a prohibited infringment under National League of Cities); Marshall
v. City of Sheboygan, 577 F.2d 1 (7th Cir. 1978) (equal pay provisions may be extended to
states; NationalLeague of Cities held to apply only to minimum wages and hours); Newark
Teachers' Ass'n v. Newark City Bd. of Educ., 444 F. Supp. 1283 (S.D. Ohio 1978) (specific
enforcement by court of arbitration promise is not a prohibited interference under National
League of Cities). But see Kent Island Joint Venture v. Smith, 452 F. Supp. 455 (D. Md.
1978) (National League of Cities seen as evidencing greater respect for states as states;
power of Coigress and federal courts to interfere is limited).
158. The broad scope of Congress' power to regulate commerce has been established
since 1824. Gibbons v. Ogden, 22 U.S. (9 Wheat.) 1 (1824). Under the commerce power,
almost any activity may be regulated even if it is only indirectly related to interstate commerce. Katzenbach v. McClung, 379 U.S. 294 (1964) (restaurant denying service to blacks);
Heart of Atlanta Motel v. United States, 379 U.S. 241 (1964) (racial discrimination in motel
accomodations affects commerce); United States v. Darby, 312 U.S. 100 (1941) (regulation of
wages); NLRB v. Jones & Laughlin Steel Corp., 301 U.S. 1 (1937).
159. See, e.g., State v. Rosenthal, 93 Nev. 36, 559 P.2d 830, appeal dismissed, 434 U.S.
803 (1977). "We view gaming as a matter reserved to the states within the meaning of the
Tenth Amendment." 93 Nev. at 40, 559 P.2d at 836; Townsend v. Clover Bottom Hospital &
School, 560 S.W. 2d 623 (Tenn.), cert. denied, 436 U.S. 948 (1978) (NationalLeague of
Cities followed).
State courts have been perhaps even more solicitous of state sovereign interests. Mossman v. Donahey, 46 Ohio St. 2d 1, 346 N.E.2d 305 (1976), decided two months prior to
National League of Cities, reached a similar result based upon Eleventh Amendment law,
although one of the justices acknowledged the existence of Tenth Amendment issues. Id. at
18-19, 346 N.E. 2d at 315 (Brown, J., concurring).
Finally, states' rights advocates, in some instances, have deified the Tenth Amendment:
"[T]his amendment is one of the most important and sacred Rights of all, albeit the
most neglected and shunned as if it were a plague, by not only the lowest in an invidious
bureaucracy but by the highest in a sometime Sleepy Hollow judiciary." In re Goalen, 30
Utah 2d 27, 512 P.2d 1028 (1973), appeal dismissed 414 U.S. 1148 (1974). "When the Liberty bell rings it is to remind that the individual State, not a federal or administrative
agency, or a federal judge is supreme." Id. at 31, 512 P.2d at 1030 (opinion by Henriod, J.,
holding that the state's interest in controlling marriage and its prisons precluded an incarcerated felon's assertion of lack of due process when he was denied permission to marry).
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A number of commentators have explored the limitation on
federal commerce clause regulation announced in National League
of Cities.160 Some have examined the concept of state sovereign
immunity in relation to other congressional enactments."6 The
elusive "balancing test" Justice Blackmun discerned in the majority opinion has likewise received attention. 162 Perhaps the broadest
interpretation of the decision cites it as supporting an individual's
constitutional rights to "affirmative governmental protection in
meeting basic human needs of physical survival and security,
health and housing, employment and education,"' 6 3 admittedly, "a

surprising [result] that leads in directions
the Justices do not seem
1 64
to have intended or anticipated.'

Regardless of its reputation as a "maverick" decision, National League of Cities is significant as the only recent decision
enunciating principles of state sovereignty. In today's political climate, where recent trends indicate a shifting away from centralized federal influence toward local and state control, 6 5 the possible
160. See generally Barber, National League of Cities v. Usery: New Meaning for the
Tenth Amendment? 1976 SuP. CT. REV. 161; Matsumoto, National League of Cities-From
Footnote to Holding-State Immunity from Commerce Clause Regulation, 1977 ARIZ. ST.
L.J. 35; Schwartz, National League of Cities v. Usery-The Commerce Power and State
Sovereign Redivivus, 46 FORDHAM L. REV. 1115 (1978); Note, At Federalism's Crossroads:
National League of Cities v. Usery, 57 B.U. L. REV. 178 (1977); Note, The Tenth Amendment is a Limitation on Congress' Power over Commerce, 25 U. KAN. L. REV. 424 (1977);
Note, Federalism and the Commerce Clause: National League of Cities v. Usery, 62 IowA L.
REV. 1189 (1977); Note, 25 EMORY L. J. 937 (1977); Comment, 30 RUTGERS L. REV. 152
(1976).
161. A number of notes and comments apply the principles of National League of
Cities to specific federal legislation. See, e.g., Comment, Municipal Bankruptcy, The Tenth
Amendment and the New Federalism, 89 HARV. L. REV. 1883 (1976) [hereinafter cited as
Municipal Bankruptcy]; Note, Toward New Safeguards on Conditional Spending: Implications of National League of Cities v. Usery, 26 AM. U. L. REV. 726 (1977) (discussing Federal
Flood Control) [hereinafter cited as Safeguards on ConditionalSpending]; Note, Constitutionality of Federal Regulation of Municipal Securities Issuers: Applying the Test of National League of Cities v. Usery, 51 N.Y.U. L. REV. 982 (1976); Note, Applying the Equal
Pay Act to State and Local Governments: The Effect of National League of Cities v. Usery,
125 U. PA. L. REV. 665 (1977).
162. See Beaird & Ellington, supra note 124, at 73; notes 248-61 and accompanying
text infra.
163. Tribe, supra note 118, at 1066 (footnote omitted).
164. Michelman, States' Rights and States' Roles: Permutations of "Sovereignty" in
National League of Cities v. Usery, 86 YALE L. J. 1165, 1166 (1977).
165. Gelfand, supra note 118, at 764, 847; Tribe, supra note 118, at 1068-69. In his
inaugural address, President Reagan announced, "It is my intention ... to demand recognition of the distinction between the powers granted to the Federal Government and those
reserved to the States or to the people." PUB. PAPERS, 1 U.S. CODE CONe,. & An. NEws XII,
March 1981. But cf. Trippett, State's Rights and Other Myths, TIME, Feb. 9, 1981, at 97-98
(discussing the failures of other Presidents in meeting that goal).
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extension and adaptation of National League of Cities by the
courts to other areas is not unforeseeable. Therefore, the balance
of this note will explore some of the possible ramifications of National League of Cities on the issue of refugee resettlement.
III. National League of Cities and Refugee
Resettlement
In analyzing federal legislation as a possible infringement on
state sovereignty under the Tenth Amendment after National
League of Cities, the salient issues are these: first, what is an "essential," "traditional" or "integral" governmental function which
will give rise to Tenth Amendment immunity?1 66 Second, should
congressional legislation enacted under constitutional grants of
power other than the commerce clause 167 be subjected to the same
state sovereignty limitations enunciated in National League of
8
Cities?""
A.

Integral State Function

An examination of congressional legislation affecting the resettlement of Indochinese refugees to see if it interferes with state
sovereignty involves an analysis of the affected state functions to
determine whether or not they meet a rather nebulous standard. In
National League of Cities, the Court variously characterized this
standard as encompassing "functions essential to [the] separate
and independent existence" of local governments, 6 9 activities of
functions,''7 and
the "States qua States,"' 7 ° "integral government
17 2
"traditional governmental functions.' 1
The most comprehensive approach to the definition of integral
state function 73 is found in the Sixth Circuit's holding in Amersbach v. City of Cleveland.7 4 In Amersbach, employees of the
Cleveland Department of Port Control, which operated the munici166. See notes 134-39 and accompanying text supra.
167. National League of Cities was a limitation on Congress' Commerce power. See
notes 127-33 and accompanying text supra.
168. See notes 224-47 and accompanying text infra.
169. 426 U.S. at 845, quoting Coyle v. Smith, 221 U.S. 559, 580 (1911).
170. 426 U.S. at 847.
171. Id. at 851.
172. Id. at 852.
173. This analysis will use the term "integral state function," realizing that such func-

tions also apply to local governments.
174.

598 F.2d 1033 (6th Cir. 1979).
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pal airport, sued the city to recover back wages under the Fair Labor Standards Act (FLSA). The Sixth Circuit affirmed the dismissal by the district court, ruling that the operation of the ClevelandHopkins International Airport was in fact an integral operation of
city government and that
National League of Cities exempted the
17 5
FLSA.
the
from
city
The court interpreted National League of Cities as applying
to "those situations where it can be shown that (1) a congressional
enactment (in the exercise of commerce clause powers) operates to
displace, regulate or significantly alter (2) the management, structure or operation of (3) a traditional or integral governmental
'17 6
function.
The court noted the traditional governmental functions affirmed in National League of Cities,1 77 those implicitly included by
7
its overruling of Wirtz;"'
and then examined a number of activities which had been held not to meet the integral state function
test. 79 Noting that National League of Cities permitted an expansion of integral state functions to meet changing times, 180 the court
articulated elements by which such protected governmental functions might be identified:
175. Id. at 1034, 1038.
176. Id. at 1035-36 (footnotes omitted). The court admitted that it viewed the holding
in National League of Cities as "creating an affirmative defense against compliance with
congressional enactments or regulations which intrude into the protected area of state sovereignty." Id. at 1035 (citing Marshall v. Owensboro-Daviess County Hospital, 581 F.2d 116,
120 (6th Cir. 1978)).
177. 598 F.2d at 1036 (fire prevention, police protection, sanitation, public health, and
parks and recreation).
178. Id. (public schools, hospitals, and health care institutions). The court also acknowledged that the licensing of drivers was an integral state function. See United States v.
Best, 573 F.2d 1095, 1102-03 (9th Cir. 1978).
179. 598 F.2d at 1037, citing, inter alia, Massachusetts v. United States, 435 U.S. 444
(1978) (operation of a police helicopter); Lafayette v. Louisiana Power & Light Co., 435 U.S.
389 (1978) (supplying of electrical service); Public Serv. Co. of N.C. v. Federal Energy Regulatory Comm'n, 587 F.2d 716 (5th Cir., 1979) (state-owned oil and gas business). The court
in Amersbach also considered state activities which had been found not to be immune from
the federal taxing power: New York v. United States, 326 U.S. 572 (1946) (bottling and sale
of mineral water); Allen v. Regents, 304 U.S. 439 (1938) (public corporation formed to operate state athletics program); Ohio v. Helvering, 292 U.S. 360 (1934) (running a liquor business). Id. See also Puerto Rico Tel. Co. v. FCC, 553 F.2d 694, 700-01 (1st Cir. 1977) (telephone company ownership); Woods v. Homes & Structures of Pittsburgh, Kan., Inc., 489 F.
Supp. 1270 (D. Kan. 1980) (issuance of government bonds); Standard Oil Co. of Calif. v.
Agsalud, 442 F.Supp. 692 (N.D. Cal. 1977) (regulation of private health insurance plans).
180. 598 F.2d at 1037 (citing National League of Cities, 426 U.S. at 880 (Brennan, J.,
dissenting), for the proposition that the majority opinion failed to articulate a specific test
for integral state functions).
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(1) the government service or activity benefits the community as
a whole and is available to the public at little or no direct expense; (2) the service or activity is undertaken for the purpose of
public service rather than pecuniary gain; (3) government is the
principal provider of the service or activity; and (4) government is
particularly suited to provide the service or perform the activity
18
because of a communitywide need for the service or activity. '

Applying its standard, the court concluded that the administration
of a municipal airport was, indeed, an integral state function. 182
Other federal courts have found the existence of an integral
state function in a state's right to license drivers,' 83 to operate its
prisons, 8 4 to regulate land use 8 5 and, generally, in its administrative and judicial processes.' 8s Although the attitude of most federal
courts has been to limit National League of Cities to FLSA
cases,1 7 an alleged infringement on an integral state function occasionally arises when a court is considering an exercise of congressional power under a provision of the Constitution other than the
commerce clause.' 8 Whether the power involved is that afforded
by the commerce clause, or is an exercise of some other congressional power, the objective criteria of Amersbach provide a workable methodology for examining state functions and the exercise of
federal power.'
181. Id. It should be noted that the court's list of factors is not intended to be exhaustive; rather, the elements listed are representative. Id. Nor should the absence of one or
more of these elements foreclose the finding of an integral state function. It seems likely
that a public hospital, for instance, should not be excluded merely because the government
is not the principal provider of health services (i.e., there are a number of private hospitals);
indeed, public health is specifically deemed "integral" in National League of Cities, 426 U.S.
at 851.
182. Since an airport must be maintained by a municipal or other governmental unit,
and since 473 of the 475 commercial airports in the United States were being operated by
public governmental agencies, the court reasoned that it "would have difficulty concluding
that... the maintenance of a municipal airport is not an integral function of government."
598 F.2d at 1038.
183. United States v. Best, 573 F.2d 1095 (9th Cir. 1978).
184. Jordan v. Mills, 473 F. Supp. 13 (E.D. Mich. 1979).
185. Virginia Surface Mining & Reclamation Ass'n v. Andrus, 483 F. Supp. 425, 435

(W.D. Va. 1980).
186. Oklahoma v. Federal Energy Reg. Comm'n, 494 F. Supp. 636 (W.D. Okla. 1980).
187. See note 157 supra.
188. See, e.g., Peel v. Florida Dep't of Transportation, 600 F.2d 1070 (5th Cir. 1979);
Camacho v. Public Serv. Comm'n, 450 F. Supp. 231 (D.P.R. 1978) (both courts applying
National League of Cities to congressional action under the war power).
189. For a recent application of the Amersbach test, see Woods v. Homes & Structures
of Pittsburgh, Kan., Inc., 489 F. Supp. 1270, 1296-97 (D. Kan. 1980) (issuance of government bonds not a traditional state function).
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and Refugee

Much of the assistance provided to refugees falls into the general categories of welfare benefits and public health services. Distribution of welfare benefits indeed seems to be an integral state
function under the criteria set forth in Amersbach.190 The assis-

tance benefits the community as a whole, is undertaken for public
service, is provided principally by government, and is in response
to a community-wide need. Since a large portion of the funding is
derived from the federal government, however, a question arises

concerning whether or not such activities are in fact "state"
functions.

The provision of welfare benefit funds to the states was originally struck down by the Court as an encroachment upon state
sovereignty. 91 The states, it was argued, were "coerced" into
adopting programs which met federal criteria. 192 During the postdepression New Deal era, however, the Court, perhaps fearful of an
unprecedented attack on its authority,'9 3 adopted a broad con94
struction of Congress' power to spend for the general welfare,

and has consistently upheld such programs. An analogy often used
is that Congress is engaging in "carrot and stick federalism"'

95

be-

cause states voluntarily participate in such programs, and are free
to withdraw if they so choose. 9 "

Increased federal aid to, and increased reliance on federal
monies by state and local governments 97 have occasioned criti190. 598 F.2d at 1037. See text accompanying note 181 supra.
191. See, e.g., United States v. Butler, 297 U.S. 1 (1936).
192. Id. at 71.
193. In response to Supreme Court decisions blocking President Roosevelt's New Deal
legislation, the President proposed the appointment of as many as six new justices to the
Supreme Court, one for each justice over seventy years of age then sitting. Stern, The Commerce Clause and the National Economy, 1933-46, 59 HARV. L. REv. 645, 677 (1946);
Leuchtenberg, The Origins of Franklin D. Roosevelt's Court Packing Plan, 1966 Sup. CT.
REV. 347.
194. Helvering v. Davis, 301 U.S. 619, 640 (1937).
195. See, e.g., Gelfand, supra note 118, at 845-46.
196. In an early case, the Court observed: "[T]he powers of the State are not invaded,
since the statute imposes no obligation but simply extends an option which the State is free
to accept or reject." Massachusetts v. Mellon, 262 U.S. 447, 480 (1923). See also Oklahoma
v. United States Civil Serv. Comm'n, 330 U.S. 127 (1947) (receipt of highway funds conditioned on compliance with the Hatch Act not coercive), "Oklahoma adopted the 'simple
expedient' of not yielding to what she urges is federal coercion," id. at 143-44; Oklahoma v.
Harris, 480 F. Supp. 581 (D.D.C. 1979) (Social Security noncompulsory, therefore not
coercive).
197. For example, federal grants-in-aid to state and local governments rose from $7.0
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cism. 195 State treasuries, on which local governments must often
rely, are limited. 199 Conditional grants which require that local governments match federal funding amounts sometimes necessitate
the diversion of funds away from certain services and programs;
thus, funding some programs in this manner may directly affect
the local decision-making process.
[I]t is no longer realistic to believe that the state or local government can choose either to accept federal money and comply with
the condition or to refuse the money on the ground that the conditions attached represent an intrusion on state sovereignty....
To refuse the money would be to deny a substantial number of
state citizens desperately needed public assistance.200
Where the services are provided by local governments,
whether from their own or from federal funds, such services may
come under the rubric of an integral (or essential) state function.
"[E]ssentiality" would consist not in any unique content or intrinsic importance ascribed to the services that local governments
typically provide, but rather in the simple fact ...

that certain

services are, with authorization from and possibly by mandate of
the state, provided by local governments ....

Since all these

services can be, have been, and are now being privately provided,
provision of them by local governments must mean that the electorate has concluded that such services ought to be provided collectively, . . . irrespective of any individual's inability or unwill-

ingness to pay for them out of private income.20 '

billion in fiscal year 1960 to $80.3 billion in fiscal year 1978, and were budgeted at $85.02
billion for 1979. Whelan & Smith, Contracts Under Grants-in-Aid-An Aspect of United
States Federal-State-LocalRelations, 6 HASTINGS CONsT. L.Q. 751, 758 n.21 (1979), citing
OFFICE OF MANAGEMENT AND BUDGET, SPEcIAL ANALYSES, BUDGET OF THE UNITED STATES

GOVERNMENT, FIscAL YEAR 1979, SPEcIAL ANALYSIS H, TABLE H-7, at 187 (1978).

198. See Furman, Impact of Federal Subsidies on State Functions, 43 A.B.A.J. 1101
passim (1957), citing COMMISSION ON INTER-GOVERNMENTAL RELATIONS, A REPORT TO THE
PRESIDENT FOR TRANSMITTAL TO THE CONGRESS (June 1955) (the Kestenbaum Commission).
Even at that date, the author considered the problems inherent in federal funding of state
and local activities: first, that the nature of such activities whets public appetite for such
services, id. at 1103-04; second, the problems created by diversion of state resources when
federal programs require matching funds, id. at 1104; and finally, the problems arising when
states begin to perform functions previously handled by private sources, id. at 1101. Compare Furman's warning of states becoming "hollow shells" within twenty-five years, id. at
1145, with this statement from Maryland v. Wirtz, 392 U.S. 183 (1968): "[The Court has]
ample power to prevent . . . 'the utter destruction of the State as a sovereign political entity.'" Id. at 196 (quoted in National League of Cities, 426 U.S. at 842).
199. See Edelman v. Jordan, 415 U.S. 651, 666 n.11 (1974).

200. Safeguards on Conditional Spending, supra note 161, at 742 n.117.
201. Michelman, supra note 164, at 1177 (footnote omitted). Compare NLRB v.
Highview, Inc., 590 F.2d 174, 178 (5th Cir. 1979), agreeing that "the care of the aged, the
sick and the indigent is a traditional function of government," with Justice Rehnquist's
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Thus, the source of funding for state and local projects and the
conditions attached to continued funding, although directly affecting such services, should not bar assertion by a state of its Tenth
Amendment rights.
The Court recently has begun to affirm states' interests in controlling the distribution of welfare benefits. As long as the process
does not operate in an invidious or irrational manner,20 2 a state
may decide how it will distribute its available public welfare resources. 0 3 "[T]he Constitution does not empower this Court to
second-guess state officials charged with the difficult responsibility
of allocating limited public welfare funds among the myriad of potential recipients.

' 204

In other words, it is a function of state gov-

ernments to decide how funds are to be allocated among those who
are to receive them. The Court has further noted that "[t]he State
. . .has an interest in distributing the available resources'205in such a
way as to keep benefit payments at an adequate level.

Payments made to refugees under the Aid to Families with
Dependent Children (AFDC) and Medicaid programs illustrate
federal regulation of a state's ability to control disbursement of
welfare benefits. 20 6 Although AFDC is funded in large measure by

the federal government on a matching-fund basis,207 participating
states must submit AFDC plans in conformity with the Act and
the regulations promulgated thereunder by HHS. °s States are
given broad discretion in determining the standard of need and
reference to "traditional governmental functions" in National League of Cities, 426 U.S. at
852.
202. Shapiro v. Thompson, 394 U.S. 618 (1969). See also New York State Dep't of
Social Serv. v. Dublino, 413 U.S. 405 (1973); Jefferson v. Hackney, 406 U.S. 535 (1972).
203. See Michelman, supra note 164, at 1167-69.
204. Dandridge v. Williams, 397 U.S. 471, 487 (1970). Such recognition of state determination is achieving a growing acceptance with the Court. In Idaho Dep't of Employment
v. Smith, 434 U.S. 100 (1978), for example, the Court noted that "in a world of limited
resources, a State may legitimately extend unemployment benefits only to those who are
willing to maximize their employment potential by not restricting their availability during
the day by attending school." Id. at 101.
205. Geduldig v. Aiello, 417 U.S. 484, 496 (1974).
206. Such programs are often described as "a scheme of cooperative Federalism"; however, it is generally acknowledged that states have some discretion to determine the level of
benefits. See Dandridge v. Williams, 397 U.S. 471, 478-80 (1970); King v. Smith, 392 U.S.
309, 316 (1968). But see text accompanying note 200 supra.
207. In 1976, federal aid to state and local public welfare programs was $13.9 billion.
ADVISORY COMMISSION ON INTERGOVERNMENTAL RELATIONS, IMPROVING URBAN AMERICA: A
CHALLENGE TO FEDERALISM 85 (1976). See generally Durchslag, Welfare Litigation, the
Eleventh Amendment and State Sovereignty: Some Reflections on Dandridge v. Williams,

26

CASE

208.

W. RES. L.

REV.

60 (1975).

See Shea v. Vialpando, 416 U.S. 251, 253 (1974).
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level of benefits; 209 however, federal regulations may govern some
situations. For instance, federal law prohibits discontinuation of
benefits for refugees who are working more than 100 hours per
month.21 0 In 1979, in Los Angeles County, California, about 600
families (2,500 persons) received aid who would not have otherwise
qualified under the state's AFDC program. 211 Based on 1979 Cali-

fornia AFDC monthly benefits of $487 for a family of four, this
represents an additional expenditure for those recipients of more
than $3.5 million per year. 11 To the extent that the state must
allocate funds to qualify for matching federal monies, there is
clearly a significant impact on the state's own programs, the administration of which may be considered integral state functions.2 1 3
In addition to the infringment on sovereignty occasioned by
conditional grants requiring allocation of local funds and federal
regulations which may override state determination and distribution of benefits, refugee resettlement policies raise significant cost
considerations in the public health services sector.1 4 The Immigration and Naturalization Act specifies certain health conditions for
which a refugee may be denied entry.2 15 Health screening is performed prior to a refugee's departure for the United States, but
questions have been raised about the effectiveness of the screening
procedures:
[T]he medical screening received in Asia by refugees has been incomplete, and the results inconsistently reported (and in some instances, deliberately misrepresented); ... refugees are known to

have health problems, some of them transmissible. All are in
agreement that tuberculosis is the most
important public health
216
problem presented by the refugees.
209. Shea v. Vialpando, 416 U.S. 251, 253 (1974). See also New York State Dep't of
Social Serv. v. Dublino, 413 U.S. 405, 410-12 (1973); Burns v. State Dep't of Social & Health

Serv., 20 Wash. App. 585, 581 P.2d 1069 (1978) (interaction of state and federal regulations
under AFDC program).
210.

CALIF. ASSEMBLY COMM. ON HUMAN RESOURCES, FINDINGS (Sept. 14, 1979).

211. Id. at 2. This represents 26% of the family cases in Los Angeles.
212. While the-amount seems large, it should be noted that although NationalLeague
of Cities cited cost effects, the essential criterion seems to be that state and local governments either would have had to alter programs significantly or to discontinue them together.
426 U.S. at 846-48.
213. As special federal refugee funding is phased out or discontinued, refugees who
have not become self-sufficient will become dependent upon local welfare systems at an increased cost to state and local governments. State May Inherit Big Welfare Bill for Refugees, S.F. Chronicle & Examiner, Feb. 15, 1981, at B1, col. 1.
214. Public health is unquestionably an "integral governmental function" under National League of Cities. See 426 U.S. at 851.
215. Immigration and Naturalization Act § 212(a), 8 U.S.C. § 1182(a) (1975).
216.

CALIF.

ASSEMBLY COMM. ON HEALTH, INDOCHINESE REFUGEE RESETTLEMENT PRO-
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The relatively high rate of positive tuberculin tests of Indochinese refugees has a significant impact:
Providing [necessary] added preventive and therapeutic services
will clearly add to the cost of tuberculosis control in the areas
receiving large numbers of refugees. . . . In the case of San Francisco County tuberculosis control program, the increased service
demand due to current Indochinese refugee immigration is estimated at- 20 to 25 percent above usual levels. The potential
sources for
financing these added costs . . . are not readily
217
apparent.

The control of infectious disease by public health agencies has long
been recognized as a governmental function. It seems unreasonable
to suppose that the population would want to risk an increased
incidence of contagious disease; yet if state and local governments
must appropriate funds to these interests, the inevitable conclusion is that "diversion of state
funds from [other] state programs
'218
. . . must have occurred.
Thus, current refugee resettlement policies may "impair the
ability of the states to function," as did the legislation struck down
in National League of Cities, by interfering with "integral governmental functions." The conditioning of federal funding on state
and local "matching funds" severely limits the state's ability to decide how its limited funds will be allocated. Regulations attached
to federal grants, even though not "coercive, ' 219 may increase administrative and other costs. The introduction of a large number of
refugees into a community affects the state's ability to provide
needed public health services for native residents. Finally, the inefficiency and delay of Congress in appropriating promised funds
GRAM, HEALTH COMM.

RECOMMENDATIONS

(1979), at 2, quoting U.S. PUBLIC HEALTH SERV.,

TEAM TO ASSESS THE HEALTH OF INDOCHINESE REFUGEES ON THE WEST COAST, REPORT TO

DEPT. OF H.E.W. (June 14, 1979). The ineffectiveness of pre-entry health screening is apparent. In Orange County, California, for example, between February and July,
1979, twelve active tuberculin cases were diagnosed in newly arrived refugees; San Francisco
reported twenty-nine cases. By failing to identify such problems, the federal program raises
questions about how many such cases have not been identified.
217. Id. at 7.

SECRETARY,

218. Whelan & Smith, Contracts Under Grants-in-Aid-An Aspect of United States
Federal-State-LocalRelations, 6 HASTINGS CONST. L.Q. 751, 764-65 n.44 (1979).
219. It is generally asserted that cases such as United States v. Butler, 297 U.S. 1
(1936), which held an act of Congress to be "coercion" in its application to the states, were
overruled by Steward Mach. Co. v. Davis, 301 U.S. 548 (1937). Justice Cardozo's opinion in
Steward, however, does not rule out the possibility that an exercise of congressional power
could be coercive. In order to find coercion, there must be a showing that such laws are
"weapons of coercion, destroying or impairing the autonomy of the states." Id. at 586.
"[T]he location of the point at which pressure turns into compulsion, and ceases to be inducement, would be a question of degree,-at times, perhaps, of fact." Id. at 590.
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prevents state and local governments from acting expeditiously to
meet needs Within local communities. The public health interest is
clearly an "integral state interest" within the scope of National
League of Cities, and thus forms a basis for assertion of the state's
Tenth Amendment interests.
It is important to note also that the introduction of a large
ethnic population has a direct impact on individual citizens or residents, who may experience a decrease in welfare benefits, health
services, a decline in the quality of the educational system, or
other detrimental impacts on community services.2 2 0 The impact of
refugees on the job market and on available housing may likewise
be significant.2 2 ' Further, refugee resettlement has sparked incidents of overt hostility directed against refugees, including rioting
and damage to property, resulting, perhaps, in a necessary diversion of police and fire protection resources in response to such
actions.22
In this context, Professor Tribe's thesis seems especially
appropriate:
[P]olicy-based legislation by Congress that endangers the provision of certain traditional services, . . . is constitutionally problematic not because it strikes an unacceptable balance between
national and state interests as such, but because it hinders and
may even foreclose attempts by states or localities to meet their
223
citizens' legitimate expectations of basic government services.
Whether the state is asserting its own affirmative defense of
sovereignty, or is asserting the claims of its citizens, refugee resettlement legislation, viewed in this context, is likewise "constitutionally problematic," and deserves recognition and consideration
220. See Soiffer, Huge Rise in Refugees on Welfare Here, S.F. Chronicle, Feb. 26,
1980, at 1, col. 6, noting that a 400% increase in the number of Indochinese refugees on
welfare prevented the city from processing applications within 45 days as required by law,
and noting indirect costs to health service and school systems. Id. at 20, col. 1-2. See generally SELECT COMMISSION REPORT, supra note 15, at 184.
221. See The Welcome Wears Thin, TIME, Sept. 1, 1980, at 8-10, noting problems with
housing, jobs, crime, schools, and backlash directed towards Cuban refugees in Florida.
222. See The Not-So-Promised Land?, TIME, Sept. 10, 1979, at 24; Louisiana: Vietnam Fallout, NEWSWEEK, Sept. 11, 1978, at 36 (citing incidents in Kansas City, Missouri,
Augusta, Maine and Pensacola, Florida); In Louisiana: The Legacy of a ParishBoss Lives
On, TIME, Aug. 28, 1978, at 4-5.
223. Tribe, supra note 118, at 1076 (footnote omitted). One Senator commented on
the inequity: "I do not see how we as elected officials can tell the American taxpayer that
vitally important domestic programs will have to be reduced or terminated yet at the same
time pass legislation which will require that billions of dollars be spent over the coming
years on an open-ended refugee program." 1979 Senate Judiciary Comm. Hearings,supra
note 1, at 71 (prepared statement of Sen. Huddleston).
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from judges and legislators alike.
C.

Beyond the Commerce Power

In determining whether federal refugee resettlement legislation is limited under the Tenth Amendment, one must consider
the extent to which the Court's holding in NationalLeague of Cities may be extended beyond Congress' power to regulate commerce. The Court offered no opinion about exercises of congressional authority under the spending power or the Fourteenth
Amendment;2 2 4 as a result, many lower courts have been reluctant

to extend NationalLeague of Cities to these (or other) powers. s
However, state sovereignty limitations have been considered in relation to Congress' war power,228 its power to implement the Fourteenth Amendment,227 and to a limited extent, the spending
power. 228 Conclusions about the application of Tenth Amendment
sovereignty considerations to refugee benefits may depend upon
the source of congressional power under which such legislation is
enacted.
Under the Constitution, Congress is explicitly granted the
power to regulate immigration. 22 If refugee resettlement and funding legislation is an exercise of that power, the states would have
little or no basis on which to argue Tenth Amendment immunity,
since there is no reservation of that power under the Constitution.
In addition, the Court has deferred to Congress and to the executive branch when making decisions affecting immigration, noting
that such decisions may implicate relations with foreign powers
224. In a footnote, the Court stated, "We express no view as to whether different results might obtain if Congress seeks to affect integral operations of state governments by
exercising authority granted it under other sections of the Constitution such as the Spending Power, Art. I, § 8, cl. 1, or § 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment." 426 U.S. at 852 n.17.
225. See, e.g., Pearce v. Wichita County, 590 F.2d 128 (5th Cir. 1979); Marshall v. City
of Sheboygan, 577 F.2d 1 (7th Cir. 1978).
226. See Peel v. Florida Dep't of Transp., 600 F.2d 1070 (5th Cir. 1979); Camacho v.
Pub. Serv. Comm'n, 450 F. Supp. 231 (D.P.R. 1978).
227. Following the Court's decision in Fitzpatrick v. Bitzer, 427 U.S. 445 (1976), lower
courts have held that there is no Tenth Amendment limitation on an exercise of congressional power under section five of the Fourteenth Amendment. See Marshall v. OwensboroDaviess County Hosp., 581 F.2d 116 (6th Cir. 1978); Usery v. Charleston County School
Dist., 588 F.2d 1169 (4th Cir. 1977); Usery v. Allegheny County Instr. Dist., 544 F.2d 148 (3d
Cir. 1976), cert. denied 430 U.S. 946 (1977). See generally Beaird & Ellington, supra note
124, at 66-69.
228. Walker Field, Colo. Pub. Airport Authority v. Adams, 606 F.2d 290 (10th Cir.
1979).
229. "The Congress shall have the Power... [t]o establish an uniform rule of Naturalization .... ." U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 4. See Hines v. Davidowitz, 312 U.S. 52 (1941).
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and must remain responsive to changing political and economic
circumstances. 3 0 It is necessary, however, to separate the admission of aliens from the provision of benefits through state welfare
systems. Once aliens are admitted for permanent residency, there
are fewer foreign relations implications; conversely, there is a significant increase in federal interaction with, and burdens placed
upon, the states.23 1
It is difficult to identify the source of power Congress intends
to exercise in appropriating funds for refugee resettlement. Enactments under the Social Security Act, the basis for AFDC and
Medicaid benefits for refugees, are couched in terms of "the general welfare," as was the 1962 legislation which first made welfare
benefit funds available to Cuban refugees. 2 3 2 The 1962 Act was an
extension of the provisions of the Mutual Security Act of 1954.233
Although the purpose and statements of the 1954 Act are couched
in terms of "common defense, foreign policy and security," perhaps
indicative of spending for defense, there is also significant reference to "general welfare," thus implying congressional action
under the spending power. 3 4 Further, legislative history of the
Foreign Assistance Act of 1961,235 the immediate precursor of the
1962 Act, indicates a legislative intent to assist state and local public agencies and to continue programs of assistance which are in
230. See Mathews v. Diaz, 426 U.S. 67, 79-82 (1976). This case would seem to raise
issues regarding parole-admitted aliens. Plaintiffs were paroled Cuban refugees who challenged the constitutionality of a five-year residency requirement for Medicare Part B benefits (42 U.S.C. § 13950 (2)(b)(1976)). The Court noted that while states were prohibited by
the Fourteenth Amendment from denying aliens state welfare benefits (citing Graham v.
Richardson, 403 U.S. 365 (1971)), a comparable classification by the federal government "is
a routine and normally legitimate part of its business." Id. at 85. But the Court had no
occasion to address the federal-state conflict in an area outside the Fourteenth Amendment
which might provide a basis for state sovereign immunity.
231. The domestic implications of refugee policy were expressly addressed by the Select Commission on Immigration and Refugee Policy. In objecting to the placement of the
office of U.S. Coordinator for Refugee Affairs in the State Department, the commission
noted that placement in the State Department, "a department primarily concerned with
international issues, belies the intention of the Refugee Act. It fails to emphasize the true
proportions of foreign and domestic policy concerns in the development and implementation
of refugee policy." To tie the office of U.S. Coordinator for Refugee Affairs to the State
Department was "likely to limit the role of the office because of the many-sided domestic
aspects of refugee and asylee programs." SELECT COMMISSION REPORT, supra note 15, at 199
(emphasis added).
232. See Migration and Refugee Assistance Act of 1962, Pub. L. No. 87-510, 76 Stat.
121.
233. Mutual Security Act of 1954, ch. 937, 68 Stat. 832.
234. See [1954] U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEws 3175.
235. Act of Sept. 4, 1961, Pub. L. No. 195, 75 Stat. 424.
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the interest of the United States.3 6 Since Indochinese Refugee Assistance Program funding to the states is provided under the 1962
Act, coupled with general welfare benefit legislation, it would also
seem to be an exercise of the congressional spending power, rather
than of the power to regulate immigration.
The Court generally has given a broad reading to the spending
power. 3 7 Justice Brennan's dissent implies that Congress could effect the same result as that struck down in National League of
Cities "by conditioning grants of federal funds upon compliance
with federal minimum wage and overtime standards.'

23 8

But if

congressional action under the spending power is not subject to
any considerations of state sovereignty, the result seems problematic: If there is a significant impairment of integral state functions,
then the "'limits on the power of Congress to override state sovereignty' [announced
in National League of Cities] will prove non' '239
existent.

If, then, the appropriation of funds for refugee resettlement is
an exercise of the spending power, it should be noted that:
[A] conditional grant forces states and localities to choose between either refusing to give up attributes of sovereignty and
forfeiting benefits or abandoning their constitutionally mandated
sovereignty in order to accept such benefits. The budgetary constraints faced by most states and localities compel them to accept
the latter choice. If, as Usery holds, the constitutional principle of
state sovereignty prevents Congress from acting under its commerce power to impose certain federal policies on state and local
governments, it is difficult to conceive of any doctrinal basis for
allowing the violation of this constitutional principle under the
236.

See S. REP. No. 989, 87th Cong., 1st Sess. (1961); H.R. REP. No. 1066, 87th Cong.,

1st Sess. (1961), reprinted in [1961] U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEWS 1791.

237. See Rosado v. Wyman, 397 U.S. 397 (1970); King v. Smith, 392 U.S. 309 (1968);
Vermont v. Brinegar, 397 F. Supp. 606 (D. Vt. 1974); Gelfand, supra note 118, at 819-22.
Steward Mach. Co. v. Davis, 301 U.S. 548 (1937), and Helvering v. Davis, 301 U.S. 619
(1937), which form the basis for upholding modern congressional spending legislation, are
criticized in Safeguards on ConditionalSpending, supra note 161, at 738-46; see also Willcox, Invasions of the First Amendment through Conditioned Public Spending, 41 CORNELL
L.Q. 12 (1955); Comment, The Federal ConditionalSpending Power: A Search for Limits,
70 Nw.U.L. Rav. 293, 298-300 (1975).
238. National League of Cities v. Usery, 426 U.S. 833, 880 (1976) (Brennan, J.,
dissenting).
239. Schwartz, National League of Cities v. Usery-The Commerce Power and State
Sovereignty Redivivus, 46 FORDHA L. Rav. 1115, 1132 (1978). The author suggests that this
should not be the case. "Was it truly necessary for the Court to march the king's men up the
hill in a commerce clause case only to offer to march them down ignominiously if the spending power were instead invoked?" Id.

Summer 1981]

REFUGEE RESETTLEMENT POLICY

spending power.24 0

A few courts have acknowledged the problem of conditional
funding as a violation of state sovereignty under National League

of Cities. In Walker Field, Colorado Public Airport Authority v.

Adams, 2" 1 the Tenth Circuit observed that "[i]t may be that some
conditions imposed under the spending power of Congress would
exceed constitutional limits," but in that case the court found no
violation which
would merit consideration of claims of state
42
sovereignty.

Another case, Camacho v. Public Service Commission,243 al-

though it dealt with Congress' war power, seemed to interpret National League of Cities to encompass not only the commerce
power, but all Article I powers.24 4 This construction seems reasonable, particularly if the Tenth
Amendment is viewed as an affirma2 45
tive limitation on Congress:
The essence of that constitutional concept is that there must be
institutional encumbrances on government intrusion into individual liberty as well as restraints on direct and discrete intrusions.
These constitutional concerns about restraints on governmental
power through institutional structure are grounded not only in
the Tenth Amendment but also
in the "structural assumptions of
''24
the Constitution as a whole. 6

Thus it seems that limitations upon federal intrusion into areas of state sovereignty should not be confined to the National
League of Cities commerce clause setting. Although certain areas
240. Safeguards on ConditionalSpending, supra note 161, at 744-45.
241. 606 F.2d 290 (10th Cir. 1979).
242. Id. at 297. Justice McKay dissented, arguing that the issue should have been addressed. "[I]t is clear that the federally mandated alteration of state government function
...

is precisely the kind condemned in National League of Cities .... The time has long

since passed when the mere formality of choice should satisfy constitutional requirements."
Id. at 298.
243. 450 F. Supp. 231 (D.P.R. 1978).
244. The court felt that the importance of NationalLeague of Cities "lies in the standards by which the courts will evaluate Congress' use of 'the necessary and proper' clause of
Article I. If the Congressional enactment 'will impermissibly interfere with the integral governmental functions of these (the states) bodies' [citing National League of Cities, 426 U.S.
at 851], then it will be deemed invalid." Id. at 234. See also Peel v. Florida Dep't of Transp.,
600 F.2d 1070 (5th Cir. 1979); New York v. United States, 574 F.2d 128 (2d Cir. 1978)
(considering application of National League of Cities to congressional exercise of the war
power).
245. For a discussion of the Tenth Amendment as an affirmative limitation on the
powers of Congress, see note 126 supra.
246. Walker Field, Colo. Pub. Airport Authority v. Adams, 606 F.2d 290, 299 (10th
Cir. 1979) (McKay, J., dissenting), quoting L. TamE, AMRICAN CONSTrTroNAL LAW 301
(1978) (footnote omitted).
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of power have been withheld from the states by an affirmative
grant of power to Congress under the Constitution, this does not
necessarily mean that there are no Tenth Amendment limits on
Congress' spending for the general welfare. As has been indicated,
there is a strong argument for extending the rationale of Tenth
Amendment immunity to any exercise of congressional power
under the necessary and proper clause.2 4 Whether refugee resettlement legislation is passed under the spending power, under the
power to regulate immigration, or under any other Article I power,
the courts should not be precluded from applying close scrutiny in
order to determine if a possible infringement on state sovereignty
has taken place.
D.

Balancing the Interests

Justice Blackmun's concurrence emphasized that he understood the Court to be adopting a "balancing approach," 248 which
would not prohibit federal intrusion "where the federal interest is
demonstrably greater and where state facility compliance with imposed federal standards would be essential. '249 But the Rehnquist
opinion failed to formulate any sort of balancing test.25 0 Lower
courts have recognized the significance of the balancing test, but
have had little guidance in its implementation.2 51
Examining the two extremes, a test is easily developed: federal
interference with an integral state function which impairs the ability of the states to function in the federal system will be deemed
unconstitutional; when a strong federal policy or overriding national interest exists, however, the legislation will be valid.2 52 Although a few instances of judicial balancing exist, "3 no clearly as247. Camacho v. Public Serv. Comm'n, 450 F. Supp. 231 (D.P.R. 1978).
248. National League of Cities v. Usery, 426 U.S. 833, 856 (1976) (Blackmun, J., concurring). See notes 152-54 and accompanying text supra.
249. Id.
250. Id. at 879-80 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
251. See, e.g., Tennessee v. Louisville & Nashville R.R., 478 F. Supp. 199 (M.D. Tenn.
1979). "Since Justice Blackmun's concurrence was the swing vote in the ultimate holding in
National League of Cities, it is impossible to discern what test, if any, was established for
analyzing congressional exercises of power pursuant to the Commerce Clause." Id. at 206.
The court then looked to the judicial tests employed prior to National League of Cities as
outlined in Arizona Pub. Serv. Co. v. Snead, 441 U.S. 141 (1979) and Southern Pacific Co. v.
Arizona, 325 U.S. 761 (1945), followed in Arizona v. Atchison, Topeka, & Santa Fe R.R., No.
78-655, slip op. (D. Ariz., 1979).
252. See Beaird & Ellington, supra note 124, at 60.
253. See, e.g., Peel v. Florida Dep't of Transp., 600 F.2d 1070 (5th Cir. 1979) (Veteran's Reemployment Rights Act); Virginia Surface Mining & Reclamation Ass'n v. Andrus,
483 F. Supp. 425 (W.D. Va. 1980) (Surface Mining Control & Reclamation Act); Jordan v.
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certainable standard has emerged to determine when and under
what situations the federal interest may prevail, once Tenth
Amendment limitations have been asserted.
Many writers have constructed methodologies for applying a
National League of Cities balancing approach. 254 One author proposes a dual test: 5 5 first, a requirement of process-that is, that
the states have an active part in any federal regulation contrary to
their interests, 256 and second, the consideration of the substantive
accomodation of state interests, including consideration of less restrictive alternatives. If a highly intrusive or restrictive alternative characterizes the regulation, there must be a determination
that this degree of intrusiveness is required to implement federal
policy. 25 1 This "least restrictive" test thus imposes upon Congress
an obligation to make a clear statement of its objectives and insures that the state interests are adequately considered.259
Another effective approach would be to balance the congressional interest in its exercised power against a state's Tenth
Mills, 473 F. Supp. 13 (E.D. Mich. 1979) (federal policy underlying antitrust laws balanced
against state's interest in administering prisons); Usery v. Board of Educ. of Salt Lake City,
421 F. Supp. 718 (D. Utah 1976).
254. See, e.g., Safeguards on ConditionalSpending, supra note 161, at 747-69; Note,
The Constitutionalityof FederalRegulation of Municipal Securities Issuers: Applying the
Test of National League of Cities v. Usery, 51 N.Y.U. L. REv. 982, 1007-20 (1976); Comment, Applying the Equal Pay Act to State and Local Governments: The Effect of National League of Cities v. Usery, 125 U. PA. L. REv. 665, 669-80 (1977).
255. Municipal Bankruptcy, supra note 161, at 1891-1905.
256. This approach may be flawed in its implicit assumption that the legislative pro-

cess adequately considers and accommodates the interests of the states. Given the present
size of Congress and the emergence of well-funded lobbyists, there may not necessarily be

adequate consideration of state interests. See Tribe, supra note 118, at 1071: "[T]he political safeguards of Federalism may... [not].. .provide adequate protection to state interests. .

.

. [S]tate concerns . . . are not always uniform throughout the country . . . the

state's interests may not be accurately represented. . . because representatives' views on
any question will be shaped by a number of often conflicting political pressures . . . reapportionment decisions have rendered the districting process largely mechanical . . . and a
given state's interest will not necessarily be easy to recognize." Id. at 1071-72.
257. Municipal Bankruptcy, supra note 161, at 1891-95.
258. Id. In a case prior to NationalLeague of Cities, the District of Columbia Circuit
Court observed that "the Tenth Amendment may prevent Congress from selecting methods
of regulating which are 'drastic' invasions of state sovereignty where less intrusive approaches are available." District of Columbia v. Train, 521 F.2d 971, 994 (D.C. Cir. 1975).
259. Cf. Walker Field, Colo. Pub. Airport Authority v. Adams, 606 F.2d 290, 300 (10th
Cir. 1979) (McKay, J., dissenting). "[Tihe concepts of institutional integrity embodied in
the federal structure and so strongly reaffirmed in NationalLeague of Cities are sufficiently
important to require, at a minimum, that the federal program employ the least intrusive
method which will satisfy its responsible spending duties and that the stipulation be relevant to the primary purpose of the spending proposal." Id. (emphasis added).
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Amendment right to "structure its integral operations. '2 60 Thus
the court should ask whether the federal policy to be advanced is
essential to the protection of constitutional guarantees, and
whether it could be effected by less intrusive means. This approach
would protect state sovereignty to the maximum extent, yet give
courts the flexibility to respond to changing factual situations. 6 "
For the purposes of any balancing test, the federal and state
interests must be identified. State interests in the area of refugee
resettlement include maintaining control over the allocation and
budgeting of its available resources in order to provide necessary
governmental services to its populace as effectively and economically as possible, maintaining control over decision-making
processes in the functioning of its governmental agencies, and in
general, maintaining its "separate and independent existence" in
the federal system.2 6 2 The federal interests include acting upon the
nation's moral obligation to the Indochinese, 263 seeing ta
that federal
funds are properly administered, 2 and having refugees settled
and integrated into the various local communities as expeditiously
as possible. 6 5
Another very strong federal interest is recognized by the Court
in the traditional deference it affords the legislative and executive
branches in their dealings with aliens. 26 6 The Court has emphasized the need for the political branches of the government to be
able to respond flexibly to changing world conditions. "[A]ny policy toward aliens is vitally and intricately interwoven with contemporaneous policies in regard to the conduct of foreign relations, the
war power, and the maintenance of a republican form of govern260. Beaird & Ellington, supra note 124, at 72-73. Such an analysis is consistent with
First Amendment cases, where the Court maximizes the protection of individual rights, and
permits only the least intrusive infringements essential to protect a compelling federal interest. See Street v. New York, 394 U.S. 576, 590-93 (1969); United States v. O'Brien, 391 U.S.

367 (1968). See generally Ely, Flag Desecration:A Case Study in the Roles of Categorization and Balancing in the First Amendment Analysis, 88 HAnv. L. REv. 1482 (1975).
261. See examples of permissive intrusion listed by Justice Stevens in National League
of Cities v. Usery, 426 U.S. at 880 (Stevens, J., dissenting). In addition, in a Tenth Amendment context, supremacy problems may more clearly arise. Beaird & Ellington, supra note
124, at 73.
262. See National League of Cities v. Usery, 426 U.S. at 851 quoting Coyle v. Smith,
221 U.S. 559, 580 (1911).
263. See notes 1-5 and accompanying text supra.
264. See, e.g., North Carolina ex rel. Morrow v. Califano, 445 F. Supp. 532, 534-35
(E.D.N.C. 1977), aff'd, 435 U.S. 962 (1978).
265. See notes 93-102 and accompanying text supra.
266. See Mathews v. Diaz, 426 U.S. 67 (1976).
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ment. 2 6 7 Arguably, these same "contemporaneous policies" apply

to refugees, but there are some important distinctions. First, once
refugees are admitted into the United States for permanent residence, foreign relations seem less significant than do domestic policies. 26 8 Second, it has already been noted in National League of

Cities that Congress' commerce power was not allowed to override

the states' Tenth Amendment interest. 269 By analogy, neither

should the spending power be allowed to do so,270 for there may be
a sound argument for impressing Tenth Amendment limitations on
all article I powers as an "interpretation of the necessary and
proper clause. 2'

71

Third, the maintenance of the federal structure

of government appears to be a vital consideration behind the decision in NationalLeague of Cities. 272 Thus, on balance, there seems
to be little basis for denying states the right to assert a Tenth
Amendment defense against the power of Congress to spend for
the general welfare in the context of admission and resettlement of
refugees.

IV.

Conclusion

Refugee resettlement legislation raises questions about the acceptable federal-state balance. It may create an interference with
integral state functions if a state is forced to provide some services
at the expense of others; accordingly, funds from one state project
must be allocated to others. 7 3 Such inefficient, haphazard and disjointed settlement procedures interfere with the ability of local
governments to provide services for both refugees and their own
citizens.27 '
Imposing a "least intrusive" regulation requirement on Congress, insuring that federal legislators adequately consider state interests and requiring a "clear statement" of federal policy and the
power underlying it, would enable the courts to review legislation
267. Id. at 81 n.17.
268. See SELECT COMMISSION REPORT, supra note 15, at 199, quoted in note 231 supra
recognizing the domestic aspects of refugee policies.
269. National League of Cities v. Usery, 426 U.S. at 842; see Peel v. Florida Dep't of
Transp., 600 F.2d 1070 (5th Cir. 1979) (war power).
270. See notes 238-40 and accompanying text supra.
271. Camacho v. Public Serv. Comm'n, 450 F. Supp. 231 (D.P.R. 1978). See notes 24345 and accompanying text supra.
272. See 426 U.S. at 841-52.
273. See notes 206-18 and accompanying text supra.
274. See notes 93-96 and accompanying text supra.
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effectively. 275 If a federal policy for refugee resettlement were
clearly defined, and if the state interests were adequately considered, it would be possible to determine whether implementation of
the policy might be effected in ways that would not intrude upon
the states' sovereign interests.
Whether the Court is ready at this time to consider such a
strong attack upon federal prerogatives is doubtful. In the context
of conditional spending programs, federal interests would likely be
found to outweigh state sovereignty considerations. A contrary ruling would drastically alter established programs and intergovernmental relations. "It is difficult to discuss so critical and fundamental a question so calmly. .

.

. [B]ecause it lies at the heart of

our constitutional system, to decide it wrongly is to alter the whole
structure
and operation of our government-for good or for
276
evil.,

Given the strong federal interest in the regulation of immigration, the Court is not likely to invalidate refugee resettlement programs out of hand. The potential impairment of state sovereign
interests, however, argues for the imposition of a "least intrusive"
test upon such legislation in order to preserve state control of essential state services and programs.
In addition, steps should be taken by Congress to bolster the
accountability of voluntary agencies so that they maintain contact
with newly arrived refugees. A more comprehensive system of registration would enable government agencies to address the
problems of secondary migration. Unequivocal and timely appropriation of funds by Congress to the states will prevent the latter
from being forced to divert available funds from established areas
of need. Recent legislation,277 while responsive to some of these
concerns, does not adequately protect the state interests involved.2 If this country is to continue to open its doors to politi275.

See notes 255-61 and accompanying text supra.

276.

W. WILSON, CONSTITUTIONAL GOVERNMENT IN THE UNITED STATES 174 (1911).

277. For a discussion of the Refugee Act of 1980, see notes 62-72 and accompanying
text supra. See generally 1979 Senate JudiciaryComm. Hearings,supra note 1; Silverman,
supra note 67, at 34-41.
278. As noted, after a given period of time, the states are responsible for the full costs.
1979 Senate Judiciary Comm. Hearings, supra note 1; at 31. See generally id. at 160-72.
Local governments have clearly voiced their preference: "When the Federal government
pursues a policy whereby refugees are admitted to this country, and when such refugees
then create special demands upon state and local governments, then those state and local
governments so affected should be fully reimbursed by the federal government for the cost
of meeting such demands for so long as such demands exist." Id. at 171 (policy position,
County of San Diego). See Refugees- Who Will Pay?, S.F. Examiner, Mar. 30, 1981, at B2,
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cal and other refugees, care must be taken lest efforts to aid refugees undermine the balance between state and federal interests, to
the eventual detriment of the refugees' new homeland.

col. 1, noting increased costs to the State of California of $9 million in 1981 and $23 million
in 1982 if federal funding was not extended beyond April 1, 1981.

